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Dynamic routing for social information sharing
Yunpeng Li, Costas Courcoubetis, and Lingjie Duan
Abstract
Today mobile users are intensively interconnected thanks to the emerging mobile social networks, where they
share location-based information with each other when traveling on different routes and visit different areas of the
city. In our model the information collected is aggregated over all users’ trips and made publicly available as a
public good. Due to information overlap, the total useful content amount increases with the diversity in path choices
made by the users, and it is crucial to motivate selfish users to choose different paths despite the potentially higher
costs associated with their trips. In this paper we combine the benefits from social information sharing with the
fundamental routing problem where a unit mass of non-atomic selfish users decide their trips in a non-cooperative
game by choosing between a high-cost and a low-cost path. To remedy the inefficient low-content equilibrium where
all users choose to explore a single path (the low-cost path), we propose and analyse two new incentive mechanisms
that can be used by the social network application, one based on side payments and the other on restricting access
to content for users that choose the low cost path. Under asymmetric information about user types (their valuations
for content quality), both mechanisms efficiently penalise the participants that use the low-cost path and reward the
participants that take the high-cost path. They lead to greater path diversity and hence to more total available content at
the social cost of reduced user participation or restricted content to part of the users. We show that user heterogeneity
can have opposite effects on social efficiency depending on the mechanism used. We also obtain interesting price of
anarchy results that show some fundamental tradeoffs between achieving path diversity and maintaining greater user
participation, motivating a combined mechanism to further increase the social welfare. Our model extends classical
dynamic routing in the case of externalities caused from traffic on different paths of the network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Emerging mobile social networks are developing fast to strengthen mobile users’ social ties and allow
them to share useful location-based information with others. The information is usually aggregated over all
users’ trips and made publicly available to benefit all users that participate. The shared information (e.g.,
about shopping promotions and locations, restaurant discovery, air quality, traffic conditions, etc.) weigh
heavily on users’ daily life, and is considered a public good that benefits all. Plenty of such information
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2sharing applications (e.g., TripAdvisor and Yelp1) have been proposed to involve millions of mobile users,
and the revenue of the related location-based services is expected to increase to around US$40 billions
by 2019 [1]. For example, Microsoft has recruited workers through Gigwalk, a famous mobile platform,
to photograph 3D panoramas of businesses and restaurants, which are integrated to Bing Maps data [2].
Another example is that to collect air quality data, mobile participatory sensing systems are developed that
request participants to choose diverse routes to sense [3].
Social information sharing via mobile routing and sensing comes at a cost to the mobile users. Travelling
on a path generally incurs a travel cost, e.g., cost of time and gas to a user. When making routing decisions
to sense information, users are selfish and may only choose the routes with such minimum costs. Hence,
incentive mechanisms are crucial for inducing larger participation and motivating individuals to perform
diverse routing and sensing tasks that are more valuable to the community. Such mechanisms, designed
by a “social planner”, must consider the various costs and benefits related to the potential information
collected by the participants. Prior routing game literature did not study any social benefit from information
sharing among users, but only looked at users’ travel costs (e.g., congestion generated by users on the
same route) for equilibrium routing analysis. The prior literature mainly used concepts Nash equilibrium
for best-response users or Wardrop equilibrium for non-atomic users (e.g., [4], [5], [6], [7]), and analyzed
price of anarchy under different pricing schemes to control congestion. Differently, this paper studies how
to regulate dynamic routing that includes not only the travel costs along the paths but also the benefit users
get from the shared information collected along all paths. Hence, our model extends in a fundamental way
the traditional dynamic routing setup to include the positive externalities generated by users traveling on
different paths: a user traveling on one path benefits from the content collected by users traveling on another
path.
We also note that this paper is different from the recent mobile crowdsensing studies (e.g., [3], [8], [9],
[10], [11], ), which focused on the analysis of participation incentives via auction, contract or pricing in
a principal-agent structure under asymmetric information. In our model users are non-atomic, and while
travelling they collect information that is useful to all, acting as both information contributors and consumers.
Borrowing concepts from standard public good models (e.g., [12], [13]), our model combines information
sharing with routing decision incentives to collect information from different routes when this has a high
informational value to the community. Our aim is to design optimal incentive mechanisms for heterogeneous
users to use paths with potentially higher costs in order to increase the level of public good provisioning,
1See www.tripadvisor.com and www.yelp.com
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Fig. 1. A unit mass of users travels from source s to destination t. Travelling on the (high cost) H-path generates to a user a cost of cH > 0,
while travelling on the (low cost) L-path generates a cost of cL = 0. Each path contains N/2 pieces of information.
i.e., the diversity and value of information available to the community.
Our basic content sharing model starts with a single path. Participants using this path collect information
that is aggregated by the system planner in a sub-additive way (due to possible information overlaps), and
made available to the community as a public good with controlled access. The valuation of this public good
may depend on a user’s type that is private information. Under asymmetric information, the social planner
knows the fraction of users in each type but cannot distinguish between individual users. In the case of
multiple paths, information collected from different paths is independent, and hence the same number of
users traveling over different paths generates more total content compared to traveling over a single path.
As shown in Fig. 1, our network routing model is the simplest possible involving only two paths (similar
to the fundamental routing problem in [7]): H with some non-zero high cost, and L with low cost, for
simplicity equal to zero. Though simple, this network model captures users’ heterogeneity in travel cost and
content valuation, and allows us to explain intuitively and clearly the loss of efficiency due to users’ private
information that various incentive policies exhibit. Adding a non-linear congestion cost term in each path
does not change the qualitative properties of our equlibrium results, but makes the analysis unnecessarily
more complex.
We analyse a non-cooperative game where a unit mass of selfish non-atomic users must decide their trips
by choosing between the two paths. Our model extends traditional routing game models (e.g., [4], [5], [6])
by considering both the costs of the trips and the information value obtained by having access to the total
amount of collected content. Each user has a “type” regarding her valuation for content: how much she
benefits from the content collected (per unit), or equivalently, in the case of using an application processing
this content, how the quality of the calculations depend on the amount of content made available. Now,
each user obtains a net utility that is proportional to her type (defined above) multiplied by the total amount
of content collected, minus her travel cost. Without any incentive, since each non-atomic user’s content
4contribution is infinitesimal compared to the total amount of content collected, the only equilibrium is for
all users to take the low-cost path. However, the social optimum in general can involve a fraction of users
taking the high-cost path to increase significanlty path diversity and hence total content available, even if
this is more costly.
For this system we address the problem of constructing incentive mechanisms for motivating the optimal
fraction of users to take the high-cost path, achieving the best possible tradeoff between travel cost and
content value. Our benchmark for evaluating social efficiency is the centralized model where the social
planner dictates the optimal routing actions for all the users. We analyse the properties of two individually
rational, incentive compatible and budget balanced incentive mechanisms, one using side payments and
the other restricting access to content. Side payments are collected from users choosing the low-cost path
and create subsidies to users that take the high-cost path, to keep the budget balanced. We expect such a
mechanism to be implemented by the content sharing social network application; for example, by reducing
membership fees to users that take the high-cost path.
Content-restriction is implemented by controlling the fraction a < 1 of the content made accessible to
users that take the low-cost path (same as “destroying” a fraction 1 − a of the content being collected),
and does not require a billing system as side-payment does. Both schemes penalise directly or indirectly
the users that choose the low-cost path and reward the users that take the high-cost path. We capture
the important trade-off between achieving greater path diversity at the expense of lower user participation
or higher content destruction, and show that higher user diversity in their valuation for content can have
opposite effects in the two mechanisms.
Though simple, this network model captures heterogeneity (i) of paths in travel cost and (ii) of users
in content valuation. It shows the loss of efficiency due to users’ private information that reduces the
capabilities of the social planner (application) to control routing decisions.
Our main findings are summarised as follows.
• Side payments inflict the same cost/benefit to all user independently of their types and there is a
tension between raising the cost for users choosing the low-cost path and violating the participation
condition of low valuation users. It turns out that when users have homogeneous valuations for content,
side payments don’t suffer from this participation issue and achieve social optimality (with price of
anarchy (PoA) equal to 1), while when users have diverse content valuations, under the optimum
incentive scheme users of low-valuation type may not participate, reducing efficiency and PoA to
1/2 from the social optimum where the social planner has full power.
5• By restricting content, users who value content more have a stronger incentive to take the high-
cost path. This incentive scheme affects more the high-valuation user type, even if this is private
information. Contrary to the side-payment case mentioned earlier, user diversity improves performance
since high valuation type users may be willing to move to the H path even if information restriction
is low on the L path. Hence under some conditions on user type distribution, content restriction can
be more efficient than side payments. Again, it achieves a PoA 1/2.
• Combining the two incentive schemes produces strictly better results than using any single one.
Applying a degree of content restriction reduces the amount of side payments needed to induce path
diversity, hence increasing low-valuation users’ participation. We show that the PoA is beyond 0.7.
• Robustness of the results concerning the two incentive schemes is shown by extending our model to
a more general network model including more than two paths and with possible path overlap. We
successfully address the new challenges of these models including multiple and unstable equilibria
in the optimal incentive design.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system model when crowdsensing
meets routing. Sections III and IV present and analyze the two kinds of mechanisms. Section V shows
the combined mechanism. Section VI shows simulation results. Section VII and Section VIII show some
extensions of our model. Section IX concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
When a user travels, she continuously senses information that is useful for the user community. This
information is aggregated over all users and offered back to the user community as a public good. We
consider the network model from source node s to destination node t in Fig. 1, where there are two paths
from the set P := {H,L}. Though simple, the two-path network model still captures all the interesting
aspects of incentive-based routing policies in a clear and educational way. A more general network with
multiple paths and path overlap is further analyzed in Section VII.
Travelling on the H-path (L-path) incurs a travel cost, e.g., cost of time and gas, cH (cL) to a user, where
cH > cL. For simplicity, we normalize these costs so that cH > 0 and cL = 0. Such costs are determined by
well-known exogenous factors like traveling distance, average congestion during time of travel, and quality
of road surface, which are therefore common for all users. Note that the travel costs per user are fixed and
do not depend on the amount of traffic along the paths. This is sensible our system users (e.g., in Gigwalk)
6are assumed to represent a small fraction of the total population that travels.2
Given the two path candidates H-path and L-path, we except a large number n of users that make selfish
routing decisions in a one-shot game. Since n is assumed large for routing, we reasonably consider an
individual user to be non-atomic as in most of the routing game literature (e.g., [4], [5], [6]), and model
our n users by a single infinitely divisible unit mass of non-atomic users. In this one-shot game, each user
chooses a path P ∈ P . We denote by xH the fraction of the users that choose the H-path, leaving 1− xH
to use the L-path.
Users obtain a net benefit that is determined by travel costs and the information collected. To model
this information value we need to define an information or content model, i.e., how different user routing
decisions affect the total information collected. We present now a specific model for information collection
that motivates the general properties that such information collection models should possess.
For simplicity, we model the total information available in the network as a set of N different information
pieces uniformly distributed along the two paths, i.e., each path has N/2 independent information pieces
with no information overlap between paths.3 Since paths are symmetric in term of available information,
we denote by4 Q1(x) the expected number of independent pieces of information collected over an arbitrary
path if (i) a fraction x of the n users (or a mass 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 among the total unit mass of users) travel
over that path, (ii) each user collects φ distinct information pieces among the N/2 available, and (iii) each
user selects her information items independently of other users. In this model each information piece has
probability φ/(N/2) to be sensed by a given user, and probability 1 − (1 − φ/(N/2))nx to be sensed by
at least one among the nx users. Hence, the total average number of items sensed by our nx users (the
average “information content”) on this single link is
Q1(x) =
N
2
(
1− (1−
2φ
N
)nx
)
, (1)
which is concave and increasing in x. Similarly, the information value on the other path is Q1(1−x) since
n(1 − x) users will take this second path. We denote by Q(x, 1) the total information content collected
and aggregated from both paths when a fraction x of the total unit mass of users choose one of the paths,
which is given by
Q(x, 1) = Q1(x) +Q1(1− x) . (2)
2When future users no longer represent a small fraction, we will consider traffic-related costs depending on users’ routing decisions as in
the routing game literature (e.g., [4], [5], [6]).
3Our model and analysis can be easily extended to any information partition between the two paths.
4We use the subscript 1 in Q to denote the content collected from a single link.
7This is concavely increasing in x when 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5 and decreasing when 0.5 < x ≤ 1. As not all users
may participate, we may extend this notation and denote by
Q(x, b) = Q1(x) +Q1(b− x), (3)
where the total information content obtained if a mass x out of a total of b chooses one of the paths (hence
b − x chooses the other path). Hence, b is the active participation fraction among users and the shape of
our content function depends on the richness of the content (value of N) and the actual member of users
that are abstracted into a continuous mass.
The above example motivates the properties of more general information content functions Q(x, 1) that
are based on different forms of the Q1(x) function. We require that Q(x, 1): (i) increasing and concave for
0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5, and (ii) Q(x, 1) = Q(1− x, 1). This implies that creating a more balanced traffic in the two
links increases the total sensed information. Our results in the later sections do not depend on the specific
model in (1), assuming any general (but “sensible”) model of information content mentioned above. In the
rest of the paper we use the H-path as the reference path, corresponding to the use of x = xH in the above
formulas. Hence, Q(xH , 1) is the total content available assuming that xH traffic goes through the H-path.
We next address that users may have different valuations for content, i.e., have different sensitivities to
the total amount of content Q(xH , 1) made available. For example, a user might have little use of the total
content or require a small fraction of this content (equivalently, care less about the quality of the service
provided by the application). We model this by a multiplicative parameter θ. To make our analysis simpler,
we consider two valuation types among users, denoted by θ1 and θ2, where θ1 ≤ θ2. An important parameter
of the model is the average valuation θ0 given by
θ0 = ηθ1 + (1− η)θ2 , (4)
where η and 1 − η are the user proportions in low and high valuations respectively. We assume that user
types are private information (i.e., only a user knows its type θi) and that the system only knows the value
of η (i.e., the fraction of each type in the total population). If a user with type i ∈ {1, 2} chooses path
P ∈ {H,L}, her payoff is the difference between her perceived information value θiQ(xH , 1) and the travel
cost on path P . That is,
ui(P, xH) =

 θiQ(xH , 1), if P = L,θiQ(xH , 1)− cH , if P = H, (5)
and the user will prefer the path with a higher payoff. Observe that in our non-atomic user model an
individual user has an infinitesimal contribution to Q(xH , 1), thus her perceived information value θiQ(xH , 1)
8is not affected by her path choice P . But it depends on the choices made by the rest of the users through
the value of xH . We naturally formulate such interaction among users in path choosing as a content routing
game. We denote a feasible flow’s path partition by (xH , 1 − xH), or just by xH since the flow on the
L-path follows uniquely from xH . The next definition is the equivalent of a Wardrop equilibrium (we place
a hat over a symbol to denote equilibrium flow).
Definition 1: A feasible flow xˆH in the content routing game is an equilibrium if no user traveling over
the H-path or the L-path will profit by deviating from her current path choice to increase her payoff.
The social welfare (total system efficiency) is defined as
SW (xH) = ηθ1Q(xH , 1) + (1− η)θ2Q(xH , 1)− xHcH
= θ0Q(xH , 1)− xHcH . (6)
If we can perfectly control all users’ decisions in a centralized way, we can achieve the social optimum
flow x∗H that maximises SW (xH) in (6) without any constraint:
x∗H ∈ argmax
0≤xH≤1
{θ0Q(xH , 1)− xHcH} . (7)
(We use superscript ∗ to denote optimal values). It is easy to see that x∗H ∈ [0, 0.5], otherwise we can
replace it by 1− x∗H to achieve the same information value in (2) at a smaller total cost on the H-path.
A. Equilibrium without Incentive Design
In real world users are selfish and may not behave optimally without appropriate incentives. We now
analyse the users’ behavior in the content routing game without any added incentives. Notice no matter
which path a user of type-i chooses, the information value she perceived is always θiQ(xH , 1) according
to (5) and hence her choice only depends on path cost. Therefore, the selfish routing strategy is for every
user to choose the L-path at the equilibrium.
Proposition 1: There exists a unique equilibrium for our content routing game: xˆH = 0 and the resultant
social welfare is SW (0) = θ0Q(0, 1).
There is a gap between optimal social welfare and the social welfare attained at the above equilibrium. We
measure the gap by price of anarchy (PoA) [14], which is the ratio between the lowest social welfare at any
equilibrium and the optimal social welfare SW (x∗H), by searching over all possible system parameters and
Q(·, 1) functions. In our content routing game, the specific formula of PoA without any added incentives
is
PoA = min
θi,Q(·,1),cH
θ0Q(0, 1)
SW (x∗H)
.
9Proposition 2: The price of anarchy of the content routing game without incentive design is PoA = 1/2.
Proof: Note that the maximal quantity of content is attained by letting half flow go through the high
cost path and half go through the low cost path, hence
SW (x∗H) ≤ max
0≤xH≤1
{θ0Q(xH , 1)} = θ0Q(0.5, 1).
Thus the price of anarchy is lower-bounded as follows:
PoA ≥ min
θi,Q(·,1),cH
θ0Q(0, 1)
θ0Q(0.5, 1)
= min
Q1(·)
Q1(1)
2Q1(0.5)
≥
1
2
,
The last inequality is because that Q1(xH) is a nondecreasing function of xH .
We can show that the bound is also tight and hence PoA = 1/2 by constructing a suitable function
Q1(x). Let
Q1(x) =

 2qx 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5;q 0.5 ≤ x ≤ 1. (8)
Then Q(x, 1) = q+2qx, 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5. This corresponds to having a finite amount of content, and that each
user discovers some new piece of content with no overlaps. Consider any fixed value of cH that is less than
2θ0q, then x∗H = 0.5. Using this setup, the PoA for this specific instance becomes
PoA = min
θi,cH
θ0Q(0, 1)
SW (0.5)
= min
θi,cH
θ0q
2θ0q − 0.5cH
=
1
2
.
This completes the proof that PoA = 1
2
.
The H-path cost cH > 0 motivates all users to take the L-path and leads to the inefficient equilibrium.
Hence a sufficiently small but positive cost leads to the biggest loss of efficiency, as the equilibrium ignores
completely the content on the H-path. Realizing the inefficiency, we want to design incentive mechanisms
to approach social optimum SW (xˆH) with the following properties.
1) Individual rationality (IR): The payoff of each H- or L-path participant should be non-negative to
guarantee participation.
2) Incentive compatibility (IC): Each user with type-i should truthfully decide routing according to her
real valuation θi.
3) Budget balance (BB): The money collected from some users (if any) should be distributed to the rest
of the users. Many crowdsensing applications (e.g., Waze) want to maximize the social welfare and
are not profitable in forming a community among users.
We will introduce in the following sections two incentive schemes which satisfy the above properties:
side-payment and content-restriction.
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TABLE I. SUMMARY OF KEY NOTATIONS
Symbol Physical meaning
cP Travel cost on P - path, P ∈ {H,L}
N Total number of information contained on the two paths
n Total number of non-atomic users
xH Fraction of H-path participants in n users
Q1(xH ) H-path’s content collected by xH proportion of users
Q(xH , 1) Content of both paths given the partition (xH , 1− xH)
θi Type-i users’ private valuation towards information, i ∈ {1, 2}
η Fraction of type-1 users out of n users
ui(P, xH) A type-i user’s payoff, i ∈ {1, 2}, by choosing path P under xH
SW (xH) Social welfare with xH proportion of H-path participants
x∗H Free social welfare maximizer in (7)
xˆH Equilibrium of the content routing game
b Active participation fraction (less than 1) of the unit mass of users
g(xH ) Side-payment function under xH
a Content-restriction coefficient (less than 1)
We list all the key notations used in this paper in Table I.
III. SIDE PAYMENTS AS INCENTIVE
The idea of using side-payment as an incentive is to incentivize more users to choose H-path by charging
more users that take the L-path (and providing positive subsidies to users of the H-path). When applying
side-payment (on the L-path), it is possible that some users with low-valuation type θ1 (“low valuation
users”) may choose not to participate, since their payoffs can be negative. In this case, only a proportion
b ≤ 1 of the unit mass of users will participate. To address this reduction of the total mass of users in
the system we use the definition in (3). We can now formally introduce the side-payment mechanism as
follows.
Side-payment Mechanism: We charge an extra cost g(xH) on each of (b− xH)n L-path participants and
refund an amount (b−xH)g(xH)/xH equally to each among the nxH H-path participants to keep the budget
balanced5.
Our side-payment mechanism only depends on a user’s path choice and not on her private type, and
will ensure IC. This side-payment mechanism requires a billing system (e.g., Amazon Mechanical Turk)
to enable monetary transfer between users. As long as users want to access the public information, they
need to accept this mechanism’s policy and use the billing system. In Section IV, we will introduce another
5 Note that in our notation g(xH) is charged to the (1− xH) users in the L-path flow, although we denote it as a function of the value xH
of the H-path flow.
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incentive mechanism based on content-restriction, that does not require such a billing system.
After introducing the side-payment mechanism, the payoffs of users change. Depending on her path
choice (H or L), a user of type i ∈ {1, 2} will receive a refund (b − xH)g(xH)/xH or have to submit
payment g(xH). Her payoff changes from (5) to
ui(P, xH) =


θiQ(xH , b)− g(xH) if P = L;
θiQ(xH , b)− cH +
b−xH
xH
g(xH) if P = H.
(9)
Consider any positive equilibrium xˆH > 0. A type-i user’s payoff difference between taking the H and
L paths is zero when
−cH +
b− xˆH
xˆH
g(xˆH) + g(xˆH) =
b
xˆH
g(xˆH)− cH ,
which does not depend on its type. Hence in order to have a positive flow on both paths we need the above
incentive difference to be zero, i.e., the payment function g must satisfy
g(xˆH) = xˆH
cH
b
. (10)
We say an equilibrium is asymptotically stable [15] if a small perturbation of the traffic on the two
links, say adding (subtracting) small ǫ to the H-path and subtracting (adding) the ǫ from L-path, does not
move the system away from the equilibrium. Stability is an important criterion for an equilibrium to be
implementable, thus we only consider stable equilibria in this paper. We say that we can incentivise (as an
equilibrium) the flow value xˆH if xˆH can be obtained as a stable equilibrium for some payment function
g(xH). We now provide the design of a budget balanced payment scheme that incentivises any flow partition
between the two paths (without considering IR, which will be dealt later).
Proposition 3: Assume BB but not necessarily IR, a total mass of users b ≤ 1, and any target equilibrium
xˆH . The following side-payment function gxˆH(xH) incentivizes xˆH :
gxˆH(xH) =
xˆHcH(b− xH)
b(b− xˆH)
. (11)
Observe that at the target equilibrium xˆH , each user’s total perceived cost (travel cost plus payment or
minus subsidy) is equal to xˆHcH/b, independently of the path choice. Thus the equilibrium payoff of a
type-i user is
θiQ(xˆH , b)− gxˆH(xˆH) = θiQ(xˆH , b)−
xˆH
b
cH . (12)
Notice that the payment function (11) becomes (10) when xH = xˆH , which ensures that xˆH is an
equilibrium under the side-payment design in (11). (11) also implies convergence from any xH to the stable
target xˆH :
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• If xH > xˆH , the corresponding (11) is smaller than equilibrium payment in (10), motivating more
users to choose L-path with smaller penalty and xH decreases.
• If xH < xˆH , (11) is larger than (10) and we expect a larger xH for choosing H-path to get refund.
At the stable equilibrium xˆH , each L-path participant perceives an extra cost xˆHcH/b as in (10), where
each user is indifferent in choosing between the two paths, but this cost may not be covered by her
information value and can drive her out of the crowdsensing system. Hence, besides Proposition 3, we need
to consider IR in the side-payment design. We say that an equilibrium xˆH satisfies IR for any type-i user
if,
θiQ(xˆH , b)−
xˆH
b
cH ≥ 0 . (13)
In the following, we show that if users are homogeneous in their valuation types (i.e., θ1 = θ2), IR always
holds when using Proposition 3; whereas if they are heterogeneous with θ1 < θ2, IR does not hold in
general.
A. Side-payment for Homogeneous Users
Due to θ1 = θ2 in this subsection, the average valuation θ0 equals θ1 or θ2. To avoid trivial discussion,
we assume the optimal social welfare at the flow maximizer x∗H in (7) is nonnegative, i.e.,
SW (x∗H) = θ0Q(x
∗
H , 1)− x
∗
HcH ≥ 0,
which tells that under full participation (b = 1), any user’s payoff in (13) is non-negative. Thus, IR always
holds for the homogeneous user case and according to Proposition 3 we can ideally choose xˆH = x∗H in (7)
to inentivize the social optimum. We denote by PoAg the PoA we can achieve using incentive payments.
Proposition 4: IR holds always for the homogeneous user case and we can use the the side-payment
mechanism g(xH) in (11) to incentivize the social optimum x∗H in (7). In this case PoAg = 1.
B. Side-payment for Heterogeneous Users
Now we turn to a more general case with θ1 < θ2 and for simplicity of the analysis from now on we
assume the users’ proportions in both types are equal (η = 0.5)6. This η = 0.5 value is assumed to be
common knowledge, obtained in practice by obtaining users’ type statistics. Then we have θ0 = (θ1+θ2)/2
with θ1 < θ0 < θ2. In this heterogeneous case, SW (x∗H) ≥ 0 no longer guarantees IR at the desired x∗H
for the lower type-1 users, and we cannot apply Proposition 3 directly. The IR condition for type-1 is (see
6Our analysis and results can be easily extended to other values of η.
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Fig. 2. The IR constraint in the SW optimization problem. The free SW maximization chooses x∗H . When θ1 is small (e.g., θS1 here), the
IR constraint becomes binding since the corresponding small xSIR is less than x∗H . For large θL1 the IR constraint is relaxed with xLIR ≥ x∗H .
Note that xIR moves to the left as cH increases or as θ1 decreases.
(13) with b = 1)
θ1Q(xH , 1)− xHcH ≥ 0 , (14)
indicating that if we like to keep type-1 users in the system we must restrict our targeted equilibria in
the range [0, xIR], which is the unique solution to (14) holding with equality. Fig. 2 plots the user-average
information value θ0Q(xH , 1) and the type-1 user’s information value θ1Q(xH , 1) as functions of xH , for a
large and a small value of θ1 values (we can choose any θ1 < θ0 and take θ2 = 2θ0 − θ1). We observe that
the social optimum x∗H of the free optimisation problem (no IR consideration for type-1) is achieved when
the gap between θ0Q(xH , 1) and total cost xHcH is maximized as in (7). Whether we can achieve x∗H in
the constraint problem (with IR for type-1) depends on the value of θ1:
• When θ1 is large (e.g., θ1 = θL1 in Fig. 2), the corresponding xIR = xLIR satisfies xLIR > x∗H in Fig.
2, and IR is satisfied at the social optimum x∗H . In this case we apply (11) to achieve SW (x∗H).
• When θ1 is small (e.g., θ1 = θS1 in Fig. 2), we have xIR = xSIR and xSIR < x∗H in Fig. 2, and IR is not
satisfied at the social optimum x∗H . The best equilibrium decision x∗H is to either operate the system
at xSIR and ensure both types’ IR (the so-called full participation case with b = 1), or to incentivise
a flow xH > xSIR that maximises the efficiency in a system where only type-2 users participate (in
the so-called half participation case with b = 0.5).
How to maximize social welfare under our side-payment mechanism is now clear. First, we let x˜H be
the solution to the free social welfare maximisation problem in the half participation case (only type-2
participate) with b = 0.5:
x˜H ∈ argmax
xH∈[0,0.5]
{0.5θ2Q(xH , 0.5)− xHcH} . (15)
14
0 ( ,1)HQ xθ
H
x
H H
x c
1 ( ,1)HQ xθ
*
HIR
x x<
20.5 ( ,0.5)HQ xθ
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
K
L
M
N
0 (0,1)Qθ
20.5 (0,1)Qθ
1 (0,1)Qθ
1
4
1
2
0
Fig. 3. The solution of SW optimization problem where both types or only type-2 participates. MN with x∗H is the social optimum and AB
with x˜H is the optimum value when we only include type-2 only. CD with xIR is the solution if we do not violate IR for type-1 and include
both types.
Figure 3 shows the solutions of our three optimisation problems: the free optimisation problem, the case
where only type-2 participate (half participation), and the best we can do if we insist in keeping both types
in the system (full participation). By comparing the optimum social welfare we can achieve in these three
cases we obtain the following procedure for choosing the equilibirum:
Theorem 1: In our heterogeneous user model, the equilibrium flow partition xˆH and the resultant optimal
social welfare SWg are chosen as follows:
• Social optimum: If x∗H ≤ xIR, then we optimally choose xˆH = x∗H and SWg = SW (x∗H). (See MN
in Fig. 3).
• Full participation: If x∗H > xIR and SW (xIR) ≥ SW (x˜H), then we optimally choose xˆH = xIR and
SWg = SW (xIR). (See CD in Fig. 3).
• Half participation: If x∗H > xIR and SW (xIR) < SW (x˜H), we optimally choose xˆH = x˜H and
SWg = SW (x˜H). (See AB in Fig. 3).
By searching over all possible parameters and information value function Q1(·), the side-payment mechanism
for two user types achieves PoAg = 1/2.
Proof: We have to compare the full participation case with b = 1 and the half participation case with
b = 0.5 to optimally decide xˆH . If x∗H ≤ xIR then our optimum of the full participation case with b = 1
is clearly at x∗H which is the global optimum. Then we don’t need to consider the half participation case
with b = 0.5.
If x∗H > xIR, then we must consider the half participation case with b = 0.5. This is because we may
perform even better by operating a single type θ2 system in the range [xIR, 0.5]. In the half participation case
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with b = 0.5, we operate the type θ2 system alone since type θ1 refuse to participate. The best we can do
in this case is SW ′ ≤ SW (x˜H) since it could be that the optimal x˜H is x˜H < xIR and not in the allowable
range [xIR, 0.5]. Assume SW (xIR) > SW (x˜H), then when x˜H < xIR, SW (xIR) > SW (x˜H) ≥ SW ′; when
x˜H ≥ xIR, SW (xIR) > SW (x˜H) = SW
′
. Thus when SW (xIR) > SW (x˜H), it is optimal to keep both
types in the system. Assume finally that SW (xIR) ≤ SW (x˜H), then it cannot be the case that x˜H < xIR
which will be shown next, implying that SWg = SW (x˜H) = SW ′. Thus when SW (xIR) ≤ SW (x˜H), it is
optimal to keep only type-2 in the system.
Now we need to prove our claim that x˜H ≥ xIR when SW (xIR) ≤ SW (x˜H). Remember that we are
in the region xIR < x∗H . Assume that x˜H < xIR, and SW (x˜H) > SW (xIR). We will get a contradiction.
At x˜H , clearly 0.5θ2Q(x˜H , 0.5) ≤ θ0Q(x˜H , 1), hence SW (x˜H) = 0.5θ2Q(x˜H , 0.5)− x˜HcH ≤ θ0Q(x˜H , 1)−
x˜HcH . Also because of the concavity of Q(xH , 1), θ0Q(xH , 1) − xHcH is increasing for x ≤ x∗H , hence
θ0Q(x˜H , 1) − x˜HcH ≤ θ0Q(xIR, 1) − xIRcH = SW (xIR). But this implies that SW (x˜H) ≤ SW (xIR), a
contradiction.
Next we prove POAg = 1/2. Note that, if x∗H < xIR,
SWg = SW (x
∗
H) ≥ θ0Q(0, 1),
and if x∗H ≥ xIR,
SWg ≥ SW (xIR) ≥ θ0Q(0, 1).
Thus,
PoAg = min
θi,cH ,Q(·,1)
SWg
SW (x∗H)
≥ min
θi,Q(·,1)
θ0Q(0, 1)
SW (x∗H)
≥ min
Q(·,1)
Q(0, 1)
Q(0.5, 1)
= min
Q1(·)
Q1(1)
2Q1(0.5)
≥
1
2
We next show that the bound is tight. Define Q1(x) by (31), and consider any fixed value of cH that is
less than 2θ0q. We consider what happens as θ1 → 0. One can easily check the following:
1. The free social optimum: The optimum is attained for xH = 0.5, SW (x∗H) = 2θ0q − 0.5cH .
2. The optimal solution of the full participation case with b = 1: The IR condition for type θ1 is
θ1(q + 2qxH)− xHcH ≥ 0. Solving this we obtain
xIR =
θ1q
cH − 2θ1q
which converges to 0 when θ1 → 0. Hence, as θ1 → 0 the optimum value SW (xIR) → θ0Q(0, 1) =
θ0q.
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3. The optimal solution of the half participation case with b = 0.5: Since for our constructed function
Q(xH , 0.5) = q for xH ∈ [0, 0.5]. The optimum is achieved at x = 0 and SW (x˜H) = 0.5θ2Q(0, 0.5) =
0.5θ2q which is θ0q in the limit as θ1 → 0.
The PoAg for this specific instance becomes
PoAg = min
cH
max{SW (xIR), SW (x˜H)}
SW (x∗H)
= min
cH
θ0q
2θ0q − 0.5cH
=
1
2
.
This completes the proof.
Unlike PoAg = 1 in the homogeneous case, here in the worst case our incentive mechanism can be
as bad as the original system without incentives (as in Proposition 2). Intuitively, when users are diverse,
we have to decide to selectively include less users (exclude low valuation users by raising the incentive
payment) to achieve better path diversity, or to keep a larger number of users participating at the cost of
path diversity (by lowering the incentive payment and hence weakening the incentives to use the H-path).
In the half participation case (b = 0.5), we miss the low-valuation users’ contribution in sensing. In the
full participation case (b = 1), we reduce path diversity and mostly collect one-path information. If path
diversity and full participation are both critical to achieving the optimal social welfare, we may lose half
of the optimum as indicated by Theorem 1. In Section VI, we will choose Q1(·) as (1) and use extensive
simulations to show that this mechanism is still efficient in most of the time.
It goes beyond the scope of this paper to discuss issues related to the form of the content function Q(x, 1).
For instance, if our unit mass of users corresponds to a very large value n of actual users, even a small
fraction x on a path can obtain a substantial amount of the total content and path diversity is important.
If n is very small, we expect path diversity to play a less role, since these few users will discover new
content even if they travel on the same path.
IV. CONTENT-RESTRICTION AS INCENTIVE
As we have already discussed, using side-payment as an incentive mechanism needs monetary transfer
among users, which may not be possible in some applications. This motivates us to consider a payment-
free incentive design: as a penalty to L-path participants, restrict the amount of content/information made
available to them. Content restriction in the information sharing system can be done directly by making
some information invisible or indirectly by offering a lower quality application service to the given user.
Content-restriction Mechanism: To motivate more users to choose the H-path, the system planner provides
a fraction a of the total information, i.e, aQ(xH , 1), to L-path participants, where a ∈ [0, 1] is the content
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restriction coefficient. For example, if we choose a = 1 (or 0), the system offers full (or zero) information
to L-path participants.
Our content-restriction mechanism only depends on a user’s path choice and is independent of her type. It
satisfies the IC and IR requirements (since users can always take the L-path at zero cost, we have always
full participation). Under the mechanism with coefficient a, a type-i user’s payoff changes from (5) to
ui(P, xH) =

 aθiQ(xH , 1), if P = L;θiQ(xH , 1)− cH , if P = H.
If ui(H, xH) ≥ ui(L, xH) or simply
Q(x, 1) ≥
cH
(1− a)θi
, (16)
she will choose H-path. Otherwise, she will choose L-path. As a decreases, we purposely “destruct” more
shared information to L-path participants and condition (16) for choosing H-path is more likely to hold
(even more for the high user types).
A. Content-restriction for Homogeneous Users
Let us first consider the homogenous case with θi = θ0 for i = 1, 2. If we expect positive flows with
xˆH ∈ (0, 1) on both paths at the equilibrium, all users should be indifferent in choosing between the two
paths. Users’ payoffs by choosing L- and H-path are equal, i.e.,
Q(xˆH , 1) =
cH
(1− a)θ0
. (17)
In Fig. 4, we plot Q(xH , 1) as a function of xH and compare to the path decision threshold cH/((1−a)θ0)
in (17). An intersection point (if any) of these two curves tells the equilibrium where the users are indifferent
in choosing between the two paths. The threshold cH/((1 − a)θ0) increases with a and can have at most
two interaction points with Q(xH , 1). To fully characterize different intersection or equilibrium results, we
define two non-negative thresholds for a:
a = max{0,
θ0Q− cH
θ0Q
}, where Q = Q(0, 1) , (18)
a = max{0,
θ0Q− cH
θ0Q
}, where Q = Q(0.5, 1) . (19)
Such thresholds help define the following three regimes:
• Strong content-restriction regime (0 ≤ a < a): When a is small and there is much content destruction
as penalty to L-path participants, cH/((1− a)θ0) is small and does not intersect with Q(xH , 1), and
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the only stable equilibrium is that all users choose H-path (i.e., xˆH = 1). The social welfare is
SW = θ0Q− cH which is the same for any a ∈ [0, a).
• Medium content-restriction regime (a ≤ a < a): When a is medium, cH/((1−a)θ0 in Fig. 4 intersects
with Q(x, 1) at two points that are equilibria: one is xH0 ∈ (0.5, 1] and the other is 1− xH0. We can
show that only xH0 is stable7. In this regime both paths offer the same payoffs to the users, hence
each user obtains a payoff of θ0Q(xH0, 1)− cH . Figure 4 also shows that as a increases, xH0 moves
towards 0.5, and the corresponding social welfare θ0Q(xH0, 1)− cH increases towards the maximum
θ0Q− cH . Note that xH = 0.5 is not a stable equilibrium, and hence we like to get arbitrarily close:
choose a = a¯−ǫ with infinitesimal ǫ > 0 to reach the social optimum SW = θ0Q−cH asymptotically.
• Weak content-restriction regime (a ≤ a ≤ 1): When a is large, the only stable equilibrium is that
all users choose L-path. The corresponding social welfare is SW = θ0aQ and it is maximised by
deciding minimum destruction (a = 1).
Strong or weak information destruction on L-path participants causes no path-diversity at the equilibrium.
Only in the medium destruction regime we reach perfect path-diversity (xˆH → 0.5) by choosing a = a− ǫ.
When cH is small, the benefit gained due to path diversity in the medium destruction regime covers the
efficiency loss due to content destruction. But when cH is large, content destruction and hence efficiency
loss becomes very large if one likes to incentivize path-diversity, motivating the use of a = 1.
Theorem 2: Let SWa be the maximum social welfare by applying the content-restriction.
• If the travel cost over H-path is small (i.e., cH < θ0(Q − Q)), we optimally choose a = a − ǫ to
approach perfect path diversity (xˆH → 0.5) and optimum social welfare (SWa → θ0Q− cH).
• If the travel cost is large (cH ≥ θ0(Q− Q)), it is optimal to choose a = 1 since content destruction
71− xH0 is not stable after some perturbation. For example, reducing x∗H slightly encourages more H-path participants to churn to L-path.
Similarly, equilibrium xH0 is stable: decrease from x∗H encourages more L-path participants to churn to H-path, and increase from x∗H
encourages more H-path participants to churn to L-path.
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must be too excessive to incentivize path diversity. The corresponding social welfare is SWa = θ0Q
By searching over all possible parameters and information value function Q1(·), the content-restriction
mechanism for uniform user types achieves PoAa = 1/2.
Proof: In the medium content-restriction regime, we have shown that the maximal social welfare
attained at a stable path-diversity equilibrium (0 < xˆH < 1) is θ0Q− cH which is reached asymptotically.
In the strong and weak content-restriction regime, we can infer that the maximal social welfare attained at
a stable zero path-diversity equilibrium (xˆH = 0 or 1) is θ0Q. Thus when cH < θ0(Q−Q), we have
θ0Q− cH > θ0Q.
Then we optimally choose a = a − ǫ8 to approach perfect path diversity (xˆH → 0.5) and optimum social
welfare SWa → θ0Q− cH . When cH ≥ θ0(Q−Q), we have
θ0Q− cH ≤ θ0Q.
Then we optimally choose a = 1 to reach optimum social welfare SWa = θ0Q.
Next we prove PoAa = 1/2. We denote the set of all the equilibria when we apply content restriction with
coefficient a by NE(a), for example, NE(1) = {0} means when a = 1 there exists only one equilibrium
which is all users choose the low cost path. Based on this notation we have
PoAa = min
θi,Q(·,1),cH
max
a
min
xˆH∈NE(a)
{SW (xˆH)}
SW (xˆH)
.
We claim that among all the equilibria the full content-preserving equilibrium a = 1 maximises the
worst case equilibrium for all values of cH . Now we prove our claim. When a = 1, xˆH = 0 is the
unique equilibrium and the corresponding social welfare is θ0Q. Assume that for some other a′, the worse
equilibrium has efficiency higher than that. Then this equilibrium must be either one where users are
indifferent between the two paths, or one where all users choose the same path. In the first case, we know
that there is a second equilibrium where customers select the the low cost path with efficiency a′θ0Q and
this must be superior to the one where users are indifferent. But leads to contradiction since it would imply
a′θ0Q > θ0Q while a′ < 1. Suppose that the best equilibrium corresponds to users not being indifferent.
But then for all values of 0 ≤ a′ ≤ 1 this cannot be superior to the one with a = 1 we proposed.
We just proved that max
a
min
xˆH∈NE(a)
{SW (xˆH)} = θ0Q, then
PoAa = min
θi,Q(·,1),cH
θ0Q
SW (xˆH)
≥
Q
Q
≥
1
2
.
8Note that this value of a is positive since cH < θ0Q.
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We next show that the bound is tight. Define Q1(x) by (31), and consider any fixed value of cH that is less
than 2θ0q. The PoAa for this specific instance becomes
PoAa = min
θi,Q(·,1),cH
θ0Q
SW (xˆH)
= min
cH
θ0q
2θ0q − 0.5cH
=
1
2
.
Therefore, PoAa = 1/2.
Using content-restriction as incentive, we either accept the original zero path-diversity equilibrium or
perfect path-diversity in information collection. Unless cH is so high that we always prefer a zero diversity
equilibrium, we can achieve perfect path-diversity by content restriction. Though this mechanism is not
efficient when cH is large, we will see that user diversity helps improve it in the next subsection.
B. Content-restriction for Heterogenous Users
Now we turn to the more general case with θ1 < θ2. In this heterogeneous case, we search for an
a ∈ [0, 1] to maximise social welfare at the equilibrium. If a is small or large, we only have zero path-
diversity equilibria with either xˆH = 1 or 0. As long as the H-path cost cH is not too large, we should
optimally choose a medium value of a to incentivise the perfect path-diversity equilibrium (xˆH = 0.5).
If we expect positive flows with xˆH ∈ (0, 1) on both path at the equilibrium, we need to make either type-
1 or type-2 be indifferent between the two paths. In Fig. 5, we plot Q(xH , 1) and cH/(θi(1− a)), i = 1, 2
as functions of xH . If we make type-1 users be indifferent between the two paths, then
Q(xˆH , 1) =
cH
(1− a)θ1
.
Since θ2 > θ1, we have
Q(xˆH , 1) >
cH
(1− a)θ2
,
we infer that type-2 users will choose H-path and the corresponding equilibrium xˆH ∈ [0.5, 1]. If we make
type-2 users be indifferent between the two paths, then
Q(xˆH , 1) =
cH
(1− a)θ2
.
Since θ2 > θ1, we have
Q(xˆH , 1) <
cH
(1− a)θ1
,
we infer that type-1 users will choose L-path and the corresponding equilibrium xˆH ∈ [0, 0.5].
In Fig. 5, we plot Q(xH , 1) as a function of xH and compare to the path decision threshold cH/((1−a)θ1)
and cH/((1 − a)θ2). An the intersection point (if any) of cH/(θi(1 − a)) and Q(xH , 1) tells the possible
equilibrium where the users are indifferent in choosing between the two paths. In Fig. 5, only xH1 and xH2
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Fig. 5. Intersection of Q(xH, 1) and cH/(θi(1− a)), i = 1, 2 to decide the equilibrium x∗H . Only xH1 and xH2 in the figure are possible
equilibria and xH1 is stable, xH2 is unstable.
in the figure are possible equilibria. To fully characterize different intersection or equilibrium results, we
define four non-negative thresholds for a:
ai = max{0,
θiQ− cH
θiQ
}, where Q = Q(0, 1) , (20)
ai = max{0,
θiQ− cH
θiQ
}, where Q = Q(0.5, 1) . (21)
First, we assume θ2/θ1 > Q/Q, i.e., a1 < a2. This condition ensures that the decision thresholds are
separated in a sense that when the decision threshold for type-1 is below Q, the information threshold
for type-2 must be below Q and when the information threshold for type-2 is beyond Q, the information
threshold for type-1 must be beyond Q. Clearly, we have a1 < a1 < a2 < a2 < 1. Such thresholds help
define the following four regimes:
• Strong content restriction regime (0 ≤ a < a1): When a is small and there is much content destruction
as penalty to L-path participants, both cH/((1−a)θ1) and cH/((1−a)θ2) is small and does not intersect
with Q(xH , 1), and the only stable equilibrium is that all users choose H-path (i.e., xˆH = 1). The
social welfare is SW = θ0Q− cH which is the same for any a ∈ [0, a).
• Medium content-restriction regime (a1 ≤ a ≤ a1): In this regime, cH/((1 − a)θ2) in Fig. 5 is below
Q(xH , 1) and cH/((1 − a)θ1 intersects with Q(xH , 1) at two points. All type-2 users will choose
H-path and only the right intersection point xH1 ∈ [0.5, 1] is an positive path-diversity equilibrium.
We can show that xH1 is stable9. Figure 5 also shows that as a increases, xH1 moves towards 0.5,
and the corresponding social welfare increases towards the maximum θ0Q− cH . Note that xH = 0.5
is a stable equilibrium, and hence we choose a = a1 to reach the social optimum SW = θ0Q− cH .
9Equilibrium xH1 is stable: decrease from xH1 encourages more L-path participants to churn to H-path, and increase from xH1 encourages
more H-path participants to churn to L-path.
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• Lower medium content restriction regime (a1 < a < a2): In this regime, cH/((1 − a)θ2) in Fig. 5
is below Q(xH , 1) and cH/((1 − a)θ1 is above Q(xH , 1). Thus all type-1 users will choose L-path
and all type-2 users will choose H-path. Thus the only equilibrium is 0.5 and it is stable. Thus we
choose a = a2 − ǫ with infinitesimal ǫ > 0 to reach the social optimum
θ0a2Q = θ0Q−
θ1Q+ θ2Q
2θ2Q
cH .
• Weak content restriction regime (a2 < a ≤ 1): When a is large, cH/((1 − a)θ1) in Fig. 5 is above
Q(xH , 1) and cH/((1 − a)θ2 intersects with Q(xH , 1) at two points. All type-1 users will choose
L-path and only the left intersection point xH2 ∈ [0, 0.5] is an positive path-diversity equilibrium.
But it is not stable10. The only stable equilibrium in this regime is that all users choose L-path and
the corresponding social welfare is SW = θ0aQ. We choose a = 1 to reach the social optimum θ0Q.
Next, we assume θ2/θ1 ≤ Q/Q, i.e., a1 ≤ a2, and we have the following three regimes
• Strong content restriction regime (0 ≤ a < a1): When a is small and there is much content destruction
as penalty to L-path participants, both cH/((1−a)θ1) and cH/((1−a)θ2) is small and does not intersect
with Q(xH , 1), and the only stable equilibrium is that all users choose H-path (i.e., xˆH = 1). The
social welfare is SW = θ0Q− cH which is the same for any a ∈ [0, a).
• Medium content-restriction regime (a1 ≤ a ≤ a1): In this regime, cH/((1 − a)θ2) in Fig. 5 may
intersect with Q(xH , 1) at two points and cH/((1− a)θ1 intersects with Q(xH , 1) at two points. The
right intersection point of cH/((1 − a)θ2) and Q(xH , 1) xH1 ∈ [0.5, 1] is an positive path-diversity
equilibrium. The left intersection point of cH/((1 − a)θ1) and Q(xH , 1) xH1 ∈ [0.5, 1] (if exists) is
another positive path-diversity equilibrium. However, only xH1 is stable. Figure 5 also shows that
as a increases, xH1 moves towards 0.5, and the corresponding social welfare increases towards the
maximum θ0Q − cH . Note that xH = 0.5 is a stable equilibrium, and hence we choose a = a1 to
reach the social optimum SW = θ0Q− cH .
• Weak content restriction regime (a1 < a ≤ 1): When a is large, cH/((1 − a)θ1) in Fig. 5 is above
Q(xH , 1) and cH/((1− a)θ2 may intersect with Q(xH , 1) at two points. All type-1 users will choose
L-path and only the left intersection point xH2 ∈ [0, 0.5] (if exists) is an positive path-diversity
equilibrium. But it is not stable. The only stable equilibrium in this regime is that all users choose
L-path and the corresponding social welfare is SW = θ0aQ. We choose a = 1 to reach the social
optimum θ0Q.
10Equilibrium xH2 is not stable: decrease from xH2 encourages more H-path participants to churn to L-path, and increase from xH2
encourages more L-path participants to churn to H-path
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Similar to the homogeneous case, when the travel cost cH is too high, we may not choose the path-
diversity, as it is prohibitively expensive for any user type to cover the H-path. The following theorem
shows how to design an a to achieve maximum social welfare. Let SWa denote the maximum social
welfare achieved by our content-restriction mechanism by optimizing over a.
Theorem 3: When user types are diverse (i.e., θ2/θ1 > Q/Q with Q and Q given in (20) and (21)), the
optimal a depends on cH :
• If the travel cost on H-path is small, i.e.,
cH <
(θ1 + θ2)(Q−Q)θ2Q
θ1Q + θ2Q
,
we choose a = (θ2Q − cH)/(θ2Q) − ǫ with infinitesimal ǫ > 0 to reach the perfect path-diversity
(xˆH = 0.5) and social welfare,
SWa → θ0Q−
θ1Q+ θ2Q
2θ2Q
cH .
• Otherwise, the travel cost on H-path is too high to send any user there (xˆH = 0), and we choose
a = 1 to avoid any content destruction. The corresponding social welfare is SWa = θ0Q.
When user types are similar (i.e., θ2/θ1 ≤ Q/Q), the choice of a also depends on cH :
• If the travel cost on H-path is small (i.e., cH < θ0(Q−Q)), we optimally decide a = (θ1Q−cH)/(θ1Q)
to reach perfect path-diversity (xˆH = 0.5). The corresponding optimal social welfare is SWa =
θ0Q− cH .
• Otherwise, the travel cost on H-path is too high to send any user there (xˆH = 0) and we choose
a = 1 to avoid large content destruction. The corresponding social welfare is SWa = θ0Q.
The resultant price of anarchy under the optimal content-restriction mechanism is PoAa = 1/2.
Proof: When θ2/θ1 > Q/Q, in the corresponding medium and lower medium content-restriction regime
we have shown that the maximal social welfare attained at a stable path-diversity equilibrium (0 < xˆH < 1)
is
θ0Q−
θ1Q+ θ2Q
2θ2Q
cH ,
which is reached asymptotically. In the corresponding strong and weak content-restriction regime, we can
infer that the maximal social welfare attained at a stable zero path-diversity equilibrium (xˆH = 0 or 1) is
θ0Q. Thus if
cH <
(θ1 + θ2)(Q−Q)θ2Q
θ1Q+ θ2Q
,
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we have
θ0Q−
θ1Q + θ2Q
2θ2Q
cH > θ0Q.
Then we optimally choose a = a2 − ǫ 11 to reach the perfect path diversity (xˆH = 0.5) and approach
optimum social welfare
SWa → θ0Q−
θ1Q + θ2Q
2θ2Q
cH .
Otherwise we choose a = 1 to reach optimum social welfare SWa = θ0Q.
When θ2/θ1 ≤ Q/Q, in the corresponding medium content-restriction regime we have shown that the
maximal social welfare attained at a stable path-diversity equilibrium (0 < xˆH < 1) is
θ0Q− cH .
In the corresponding strong and weak content-restriction regime, we can infer that the maximal social
welfare attained at a stable zero path-diversity equilibrium (xˆH = 0 or 1) is θ0Q. Thus if
cH < θ0(Q−Q),
we have
θ0Q− cH > θ0Q,
Then we optimally choose a = a1 12 to reach the perfect path diversity (xˆH = 0.5) and the optimum social
welfare
SWa = θ0Q− cH .
Otherwise we choose a = 1 to reach optimum social welfare SWa = θ0Q.
Next we prove PoAa = 1/2. Using the notation introduced in the proof of Theorem 8, we have
PoAa = min
θi,Q(·,1),cH
max
a
min
xˆH∈NE(a)
{SW (xˆH)}
SW (x∗H)
≥ min
Q(·,1)
Q
Q
≥
1
2
since min
xˆH∈NE(1)
{SW (xˆH} = θ0Q and SW (x∗H) ≤ θ0Q.
Now we prove the bound is tight. Assuming maximum user diversity, i.e., θ1 is near to zero. In this case,
θ1Q(xH , 1)− cH ≤ aθ1Q(xH , 1) for any 0 ≤ xH ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ a ≤ 1. Since in any equilibrium, either there
is no path diversity or type θ2 users are indifferent between H-path and L-path. In the former case, the
11Note that this value of a is positive since cH < θ2Q.
12Note that this value of a is positive since cH < θ1Q.
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social welfare is either θ0Q or θ0Q − H . In the latter case, let xˆH be any such incentivised equilibrium,
then the social welfare is
0.5aθ1Q(xˆH , 1) + 0.5(θ2Q(xˆH , 1)− cH),
which is less than
θ0Q− 0.5cH .
Thus,
max
a
min
xˆH∈NE(a)
{SW (xˆH)} ≤ max{θ0Q− 0.5cH , θ0Q}.
Consider a specific Q1(·) function as following
Q1(x) =


qx
δ
0 ≤ x ≤ δ;
q δ ≤ x ≤ 1.
(22)
where we let δ be near zero. This content function corresponds to having a finite amount of content, and
that we only need one user to collect all the information on a path. Then
Q(x, 1) =


qx
δ
+ q 0 ≤ x ≤ δ;
2q δ ≤ x ≤ 1− δ;
q + (1−x)q
δ
1− δ ≤ x ≤ 1.
(23)
We let cH = 2θ0q. Then θ0Q− 0.5cH = θ0q and θ0Q = θ0q, and it follows that
max
a
min
xˆH∈NE(a)
{SW (xˆH)} ≤ θ0q.
Note that SW (xˆH) = SW (δ) for infinitesimal δ > 0. Since SW (δ) = 2θ0q − δcH , we have that the price
of anarchy
PoAa ≤
θ0q
2θ0q − δcH
,
for infinitesimal δ > 0. Hence PoAa ≤ 1/2. This completes the proof.
A corollary is that diversity in the user types increases the optimum system efficiency. This is because
type-2 users have a larger θ2 than the average θ0 and are more sensitive to the restriction on the content than
the average user. Hence less restriction is needed to make users switch and obtain path diversity than in
the case of homogeneous users. And this diversity is necessary to make this equilibrium unique. Of course
user diversity does not play a role to improve efficiency if the cost cH is too large. In Section VI, we will
choose Q1(·) as (1) and use extensive simulations to show that this mechanism is still efficient in most of
the time.
26
V. COMBINED SIDE-PAYMENT AND CONTENT-RESTRICTION FOR HETEROGENEOUS USERS
In this section, we propose a combined mechanism: in addition to the payment function g(xH) in
Section 3, we can also use content-restriction with coefficient a ≤ 1 in Section 4 as follows.
Combined Mechanism: We collect from each L-path participant a payment g(xH) for only a fraction a
of the total information, i.e., aQ(xH , b), and give each H-path participant a subsidy (b− xH)g(xH)/xH to
keep the budget balanced.
This combined mechanism jointly optimizes the payment function g(xH) and restriction coefficient a.
Depending on her path choice (H or L), a type-i user’s payoff changes from (5) to
ui(P, xH) =

 aθiQ(xH , b)− g(xH), if P = L;θiQ(xH , b)− cH + b−xHxH g(xH), if P = H.
If we let a = 1 or g(xH) = 0 for any xH , the combined mechanism is simplified to either side-payment
or content-restriction. This combined mechanism exploits the synergies of the two mechanisms. The use of
side-payments reduces the effective cost difference of the two paths. This allows for less content destruction
to be necessary for type-2 users to choose the H-path (i.e., we can obtain the desired path diversity in
a more efficient way). Of course, since in this equilibrium type-1 users choose the L-path and must also
pay the incentive fee, we have similar IR issues as we encountered before (see Section 3), but made more
acute because the content is of lesser quality for users choosing the L-path. We need to consider if it is
worthwhile to keep type-1 users in the system, or use a higher side payment and nicely control only type-2
users’ choices with some a < 1. In the following, we will show how the combined mechanism works.
Actually, as long as cH is not too large, we can show that it is optimal to have a positive flow on every
path. More specifically, we have three equilibrium cases: (i) Case.IR21: this case ensures both user types’
IR for full participation and only type-2 users are indifferent in path choosing, (ii) Case.IR12: this case
also ensures full participation and only type-1 users are indifferent in choosing between the two paths, and
(iii) Case.IR2: this case excludes type-1 users by only satisfying type-2’s IR due to side-payment.
Analysis of Case.IR21: this case ensures both user types’ IR for full participation and only type-2 users
are indifferent in path choosing. In this case, if we want to reach an equilibrium xˆH , the equilibrium payoffs
of a type-2 by choosing the two paths are equal, i.e.,
θ2Q(xˆH , 1)− cH +
1− xˆH
xˆH
g(xˆH) = aθ2Q(xˆH , 1)− g(xˆH),
which is equivalent to
g(xˆH) = (cH − (1− a)θ2Q(xˆH , 1))xˆH . (24)
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Since θ1 < θ2, we have
g(xˆH) < (cH − (1− a)θ1Q(xˆH , 1))xˆH ,
for type-1 and all users of that type will choose L-path. Thus, we have x∗H ∈ [0, 0.5]. Given g(xˆH) in (24),
we still need to ensure type-1’s IR, i.e.,
θ1aQ(xˆH , 1)− (cH − (1− a)θ2Q(xˆH , 1))xˆH ≥ 0. (25)
As long as (25) holds, we can incentivize any feasible equilibrium xˆH ∈ (0, 0.5] by using the following
side-payment13:
g(xH) =


∞, if xH ∈ [0, xˆH);
(cH − (1− a)θ2Q(xˆH, 1))xˆH , if xH = xˆH ;
−∞, if xH ∈ (xˆH , 1],
(26)
which becomes (24) when xH reaches the stable target xˆH . (26) also helps converge from any xH to the
stable x∗H :
• If xH > xˆH , the corresponding (26) becomes negative infinity, L-path participants are rewarded with
a large enough reward and hence more users are motivated to choose L-path and xH decreases.
• If xH < xˆH , the corresponding (26) becomes positive infinity, L-path participants are required to pay
a large enough penalty and hence more users are motivated to choose H-path and xH increases.
Given the side-payment function in (26), now we only need to properly choose a and target xˆH to
maximize the social welfare:
max
xH∈(0,0.5]
a∈[0,1]
(
xHθ2 + ((
1
2
− xH)θ2 +
1
2
θ1)a
)
Q(xH , 1)− xHcH (27)
subject to the IR constraint in (25). We denote the optimal solution to (27) as (xˇH , aˇ) and the corresponding
social welfare is SW (xˇH , aˇ).
Analysis of Case.IR12: In this case, the equilibrium payoffs of a type-1 user by choosing the two paths
are equal, i.e.,
g(xˆH) = (cH − (1− a)θ1Q(xˆH , 1))xˆH .
Since θ2 > θ1,
g(xˆH) > (cH − (1− a)θ2Q(xˆH , 1))xˆH ,
for type-2 and all users of type-2 will choose H-path. Thus, we have xˆH ∈ [0.5, 1]. We can show that the
equilibrium of Case.IR21 is always better than that of Case.IR12. The reason is that if we want to incentivise
13In practice, g(xH) cannot be infinity, and we can simply replace it by a large enough value.
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an equilibrium xˆH ∈ [0.5, 1] in Case.IR12, we can also incentivise another equilibrium 1− xˆH ∈ [0, 0.5] in
Case.IR21 to collect the same information value in (2) but save the total travel cost on the H-path.
Lemma 1: The equilibrium of Case.IR12 cannot be better than that of Case.IR21.
Proof: Assume that by choosing a = a´ and xˆH = x´H ∈ [0.5, 1] the social optimum in Case.IR12 is
SW (x´H , a´). Since at the equilibrium xˆH = x´H , all type-1 users are indifferent in path choosing, thus,
g(x´H) = (cH − (1− a´)θ1Q(x´H , 1))x´H .
The payoff of a type-1 user at this equilibrium is
θ1a´Q(x´H , 1)− (cH − (1− a´)θ1Q(x´H , 1))x´H ≥ 0.
All type-2 users will choose H-path, the payoff of a type-2 user at this equilibrium is
θ2Q(x´H , 1)− cH + (cH − (1− a´)θ1Q(x´H , 1))(1− x´H) ≥ 0.
Now we calculate the social welfare of each user without considering side-payment due to BB condition.
The payoff of a type-1 user who chooses L-path is
θ1a´Q(x´H , 1).
The payoff of a type-1 user who chooses H-path is
θ1Q(x´H , 1)− cH .
The payoff of a type-2 user who must chooses H-path is
θ2Q(x´H , 1)− cH .
Without consider IR constraint, we can always reach a stable equilibrium xˆH = 1− x´H by using
a′ = max{a´, 1−
cH
θ2Q(x´H , 1)
},
and side-payment function given by (26). At the equilibrium xˆH = 1− x´H , all type-2 users are indifferent
in path choosing, thus,
g(1− x´H) = (cH − (1− a
′)θ2Q(x´H , 1))(1− x´H).
The payoff of a type-2 user at this equilibrium is
θ2Q(x´H , 1)− cH + (cH − (1− a
′)θ2Q(x´H , 1))x´H ≥ 0.
All type-1 users will choose L-path, the payoff of a type-1 user at this equilibrium is
θ1a
′Q(x´H , 1)− (cH − (1− a
′)θ2Q(x´H , 1))(1− x´H) ≥ 0.
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Then all type-1 users will participate and IR is satisfied. Now we calculate the social welfare of each
user without considering side-payment due to BB condition. The payoff of a type-1 user who must choose
L-path is
θ1a
′Q(x´H , 1) ≥ max{θ1a´Q(x´H , 1), θ1Q(x´H , 1)− cH}.
The payoff of a type-2 user who chooses H-path is
θ2Q(x´H , 1)− cH .
The payoff of a type-2 user who chooses L-path is
θ2a
′Q(x´H , 1) ≥ θ2Q(x´H , 1)− cH .
Denote the social welfare attained at this equilibrium as SW (x´H , a′). Since at the equilibrium xˆH = 1− x´H ,
if we do not take the side-payment into account, each user receive a payoff better than the payoff she receive
at the equilibrium xˆH = x´H . Therefore, SW (x´H , a′) ≥ SW (x´H , a´).
Analysis of Case.IR2: this case excludes type-1 users by only satisfying type-2’s IR due to side-payment.
This is equivalent to the half participation case with b = 0.5 and a = 1 in Section III. The optimal solution
in this case is x˜H which is given by (15) and the corresponding social welfare is SW (x˜H).
Actually, besides these three cases, there is another equilibrium case where all type-1 users choose L-path
and all type-2 users choose H-path. We can show that this case with xˆH = 0.5 is dominated by Case.IR21
as follows.
Lemma 2: The equilibrium where all type-1 users choose L-path and all type-2 users choose H-path
cannot be better than the equilibrium of Case.IR21.
Proof: Assume that by choosing a = a` and xˆH = 0.5 we can reach a stable equilibrium where all
type-1 users choose L-path and all type-2 users choose H-path. The corresponding social welfare is denoted
as SW (0.5, a`). Since at such equilibrium xˆH = 0.5, all type-1 users choose L-path, thus,
g(0.5) ≤ 0.5(cH − (1− a`)θ1Q).
All type-2 users choose H-path, thus,
g(0.5) ≥ 0.5(cH − (1− a`)θ2Q).
The payoff of a type-1 user at such equilibrium is
θ1a`Q− g(0.5) ≥ 0.
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It follows that
θ1a`Q− 0.5(cH − (1− a`)θ2Q) ≥ 0.
Thus, we use a = a` and side-payment function given by (26) with xˆH = 0.5 to reach the same equilibrium
(xˆH = 0.5) in Case.IR21. The corresponding social welfare are the same since we use the same content-
restriction coefficient.
Finally, the combined mechanism is to compare SW (xˇH , aˇ) in Case.IR21 and SW (x˜H) in Case.IR2
to decide to incentivize xˇH or x˜H . Essentially, this is a tradeoff between the half participation with path
diversity and full participation with content-destruction.
Theorem 4: Depending on the relationship between SW (xˇH , aˇ) and SW (x˜H), we decide a, g(xH) and
which equilibrium xˆH to incentivize:
• Full participation: If SW (xˇH , aˇ) ≥ SW (x˜H), it is optimal to keep both types’ IR and incentivize
xˆH = xˇ by choosing a = aˇ and g(xH) in (26). The corresponding social welfare is SW (xˇH , aˇ).
• Half participation: If SW (xˇH , aˇ) < SW (x˜H), it is optimal to satisfy only type-2’s IR and incentivize
xˆH = x˜ by choosing a = 1 and g(xH) in (11) with b = 0.5. The corresponding social welfare is
SW (x˜H).
To understand why combined mechanism can achieve strictly better social welfare than any of the two
individual mechanisms, we consider the payment penalty to L-path participants given by (24). It is smaller
than (10) without content-restriction. Note that if cH and a are small enough, (24) can be negative, i.e.,
L-path participants may be not penalised but even rewarded. Negative payments on L-path occurs because
degradation of content on L-path is more critical than the cost on H-path. This allows us to relax the IR
condition on type-1 users and increase the range of equilibria where all users participate.
Proposition 5: Facing heterogeneous users, the combined mechanism performs significantly better than
either the side-payment or content-restriction mechanism, by increasing the price of anarchy PoAag to more
than 0.7 (i.e., PoAag ≥ 0.7).
Proof: Notice that the combined mechanism is better than the side-payment mechanism, we have
SWag ≥ SWg. The routing equilibrium under optimal side-payment mechanism is better than the routing
equilibrium without incentive design, i.e., SWg ≥ θ0Q. Now we will show
SWag ≥ θ0Q−
θ1 + θ2
2θ2
cH . (28)
If cH > θ2(Q−Q), we have
SWag ≥ SWg ≥ θ0Q > θ0Q−
θ1 + θ2
2θ2
cH .
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If cH ≤ θ2(Q−Q), we can incentivize 0.5 as a unique and stable equilibrium by choosing
a = 1−
cH
θ2Q
,
and g(xH) given by (26) with xˆH = 0.5. In this equilibrium, all type θ1 users choose L-path and receive
a payoff given by θ1aQ while all type θ1 users choose H-path and receive a payoff given by θ2aQ. Then
the social welfare attained at this equilibrium is given by
0.5(θ1 + θ2)aQ = θ0Q−
θ1 + θ2
2θ2
cH .
To show PoAag ≥ 0.7, we need to show
min
θi,cH ,Q(·,1)
SWag
SW (x∗H)
≥ 0.7.
Now we assume there exists an instance which is defined by the parameters θ1 θ2, cH and function Q1(·)
satisfies that
SWag
SW (x∗H)
= β, β ∈ [0.5, 0.75].
Without loss of generality, we assume in this instance θ1 = α ∈ [0, 1), θ2 = 1, Q = 1 and the social
optimum is attained for x∗H = δ ∈ (0, 0.5). We let Q1(δ) = s and Q1(1 − δ) = t where s, t should satisfy
δ ≤ s ≤ t, 1− δ ≤ t ≤ 1 and δt ≤ (1− δ)s due to our assumption on Q1(x). Then the social optimum is
SW (x∗H) =
(1 + α)(s+ t)
2
− δcH .
Because of SWag ≥ θ0Q, SWag ≥ SWg and (28), one can easily check the following
1) The routing equilibrium without incentive design: SW = (1+α)/2 should be less than βSW (δ), thus,
1 + α
2
<
β(1 + α)(s+ t)
2
− βδcH
It follows that
cH <
(1 + α)(β(s+ t)− 1)
2βδ
.
2) Content-restriction with a = 1− cH/(θ2Q) and g(xH) given by (26) with xˆH = 0.5:
SWag ≥ θ0Q−
θ1 + θ2
2θ2
cH =
(1 + α)(Q− cH)
2
≥
(1 + α)(s+ t− cH)
2
,
which should be less than βSW (δ), it follows that
cH >
(1− β)(1 + α)(s+ t)
(1 + α)− 2βδ
.
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3) Full participation case with a = 1 and b = 1: Let r = (3s+ 3t− 4)/(4s+ 4t− 4), and note that
r(s+ t) + (1− r) =
3
4
(s+ t), r <
3
4
.
Since
θ0Q(rδ, 1)− rδcHcH
≥ θ0(rQ(δ, 1) + (1− r)Q(0, 1))−
3
4
δ
≥ βSW (δ),
IR constraint can not hold for type-1 at xH = rδ. Thus,
3
4
θ1(δ, 1)− rδcH ≤ θ1Q(rδ, 1)− rδcH < 0.
It follows that
cH >
α(3s+ 3t− 3)(s+ t)
(3s+ st− 4)δ
.
4) Half participation case with a = 1 and b = 0.5: If δ ∈ [0, 0.25], we can obtain at least
0.5θ2Q(δ, 0.5)− δcH
which should be less than βSW (δ). Note that 0.5− δ ≥ δ and hence
Q1(0.5− δ) ≥
1
2− 4δ
Q1(δ) +
1− 4δ
2− 4δ
Q1(1− δ).
It follows that
cH >
(3− 4δ)s+ (1− 4δ)t− β(1 + α)(s+ t)(2− 4δ)
2δ(1− β)(2− 4δ)
,
when δ ∈ [0, 0.25]. If δ ∈ [0.25, 0.5], we can obtain at least
0.5θ2Q(0.25, 0.5)− 0.25cH ≥
θ2Q1(δ)
4δ
− 0.25cH ,
which should be less than βSW (δ). It follows that either
β ≥
1
4δ
,
or
cH >
s− 2δβ(1 + α)(s+ t)
δ − 4βδ2
.
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When δ ∈ (0, 0.25], we have 

cH <
(1+α)(β(s+t)−1)
2βδ
,
cH >
(1−β)(1+α)(s+t)
(1+α)−2βδ
,
cH >
α(3s+3t−3)(s+t)
(3s+st−4)δ
,
cH >
(3−4δ)s+(1−4δ)t−β(1+α)(s+t)(2−4δ)
2δ(1−β)(2−4δ)
.
It follows that,
β > max{
−3s− 3t+ 4δ − 3sδ − 3tδ
(s+ t)(−3s− 3t − 2δ + 3sδ + 3tδ)
,
24s− 21s2 + 16t − 36st− 15t2 − 40sδ + 36s2δ − 40tδ + 72stδ + 36t2δ
(s+ t)(12− 6s− 3s2 − 2t− 12st− 9t2 − 24δ + 8sδ + 12s2δ + 8tδ + 24stδ + 12t2δ)
}.
By minimizing the right hand side of
max{
−3s− 3t+ 4δ − 3sδ − 3tδ
(s+ t)(−3s− 3t− 2δ + 3sδ + 3tδ)
,
24s − 21s2 + 16t − 36st− 15t2 − 40sδ + 36s2δ − 40tδ + 72stδ + 36t2δ
(s+ t)(12− 6s − 3s2 − 2t− 12st− 9t2 − 24δ + 8sδ + 12s2δ + 8tδ + 24stδ + 12t2δ)
}
in the feasible region of s, t, δ, i.e.,
δ ≤ s ≤ t, 1− δ ≤ t ≤ 1, δt ≤ (1− δ)s, δ ∈ (0, 0.25],
we get β > 0.7.
When δ ∈ [0.25, 0.5), we have either 

cH <
(1+α)(β(s+t)−1)
2βδ
,
cH >
(1−β)(1+α)(s+t)
(1+α)−2βδ
,
cH >
α(3s+3t−3)(s+t)
(3s+st−4)δ
,
cH >
s−2δβ(1+α)(s+t)
δ−4βδ2
,
or 

cH <
(1+α)(β(s+t)−1)
2βδ
,
cH >
(1−β)(1+α)(s+t)
(1+α)−2βδ
,
cH >
α(3s+3t−3)(s+t)
(3s+st−4)δ
,
β ≥ 1
4δ
.
It follows that either
β > max{
−3s− 3t+ 4δ − 3sδ − 3tδ
(s+ t)(−3s− 3t − 2δ + 3sδ + 3tδ)
,
1
4δ
}.
or
β > max{
−3s− 3t+ 4δ − 3sδ − 3tδ
(s+ t)(−3s− 3t− 2δ + 3sδ + 3tδ)
,
−7s+ 6s2 − 3t+ 9st+ 3t2
(s+ t)(−s− 3t+ 3st+ 3t2 − 12δ + 12sδ + 12tδ)
}.
By minimizing
max{
−3s− 3t+ 4δ − 3sδ − 3tδ
(s+ t)(−3s− 3t− 2δ + 3sδ + 3tδ)
,
1
4δ
}
and
max{
−3s− 3t + 4δ − 3sδ − 3tδ
(s+ t)(−3s− 3t− 2δ + 3sδ + 3tδ)
,
−7s+ 6s2 − 3t+ 9st+ 3t2
(s+ t)(−s− 3t+ 3st+ 3t2 − 12δ + 12sδ + 12tδ)
}
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Fig. 6. The ratio SWg/SW (x∗H) between the optimum SW value under the side-payment and the social optimum SW (x∗H). This ratio is
larger than 70% globally. We set θ0 = 0.5 and use Q1(xH) from (1). We observe inefficiency when θ1 decreases while cH remain at some
moderately low value
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Fig. 7. The ratio SWa/SW (x∗H) between the optimum SW value under the content-restriction and the social optimum SW (x∗H). The ratio
is larger than 60% globally. We set θ0 = 0.5 and use Q1(xH) from (1). .
in the feasible region of s, t, δ, i.e.,
δ ≤ s ≤ t, 1− δ ≤ t ≤ 1, δt ≤ (1− δ)s, δ ∈ [0.25, 0.5),
we get β > 0.7.
In conclusion, we have proven that if β ≤ 0.75, it must follow that β > 0.7. Therefore, PoAag > 0.7.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we use extensive simulations to show the performances of the side-payment and content-
restriction mechanisms in the heterogeneous user case.14 Recall that both these two mechanisms can be
14We skip the homogeneous user case here, as Proposition 4 shows that the side-payment already achieves the social optimum there.
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Fig. 8. Performance comparison between side-payment and content-restriction in terms of the achieved social welfare under different θ1 and
cH values. We observe that in most cases we have SWg > SWa, and SWg < SWa only when users are diverse (with small 1) and cH is
small. Here, we set θ0 = 0.5 and use specified Q1(xH) in (1).
as bad as the original system without incentives, as we have PoAg = PoAa = 1/2 in the worst case by
choosing an arbitrary content function Q1(xH). In the following, we reasonably specify Q1(xH) as (1) and
examine the performances by varying the other parameter values.
Figure 6 compares the maximum social welfare achieved by the side-payment with the social optimum,
by showing the ratio SWg/SW (x∗H) under different θ1 and cH values. By fixing the average valuation θ0 as
0.5, we can vary θ1 value to change user diversity. We observe that as long as θ1 is large, our side-payment
mechanism can achieve the social optimum with SWg/SW (x∗H)) = 100%. This explains this mechanism
performs well when users are not diverse. Even when θ1 is small, this mechanism is still efficient to achieve
SWg/SW (x
∗
H)) ≥ 70%. When cH is zero, users will automatically reach path-diversity and this ratio is 1
in Fig. 6. When cH is too large, both this mechanism and the social optimum do not assign any user to
explore the H-path. Thus, the ratio is also 1.
Figure 7 compares the maximum social welfare achieved by the content-restriction with the social
optimum, by showing the ratio SWa/SW (x∗H)) under different θ1 and cH values. Unlike the side-payment,
this mechanism performs well when θ1 is small and users are diverse. Even when θ1 is large, this mechanism
is still efficient to achieve SWa/SW (x∗H)) ≥ 60%. Similar to Fig. 6, when cH is zero or very high, the
ratio is 1 in Fig. 7 without any efficiency loss.
As PoAa = PoAg = 1/2 in the worst case, it is difficult to analytically compare the two mechanisms’
performances. Figure 8 numerically compares the side-payment and content-restriction mechanisms in terms
of social welfare (SWa versus SWg) under different values of θ1 and cH . We observe that in most cases
we have SWg > SWa, and SWg < SWa only when users are diverse (with small θ1) and cH is small.
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Fig. 9. Comparison between SW (x∗H), SWg and SWa under different values of θ1. We observe SWa > SWg for small θ1 and SWa < SWg
for large θ1. We set θ0 = 0.5 and use Q1(xH) in (1).
When users are diverse, the type-1 users’ IR becomes a problem under the side-payment, which may
sacrifice type-1 users’ participation to reach path-diversity in the half-participation case. Differently, the
content-restriction mechanism does not worry about IR and can achieve prefect path-diversity in the full-
participation case. Thus, SWg < SWa when both θ1 and cH are small. Note that when cH is small, to
achieve the path-diversity, the content-restriction does not need to destruct much information to motivate
users to H-path.
Figure 9 further shows the social welfare values achieved by the two mechanisms and compares to the
social optimum. When cH is small (e.g., cH = 20 in Fig. 9), we have SWa > SWg for small θ1 ∈ [0, 0.042].
But when users are less diverse and θ1 increases beyond 0.042, we have SWa < SWg. When θ1 is large
enough, SWg achieves the social optimum SW (x∗H)).
VII. NETWORK MODEL GENERALIZATION
Unlike our simple two-path model in Fig. 1, people in practice may have more than two choices of routes
if they would like to travel from one point to another. In addition, different routes may have some overlap
with each other. In this section, we consider a more general network with K ≥ 3 parallel paths following
a path overlap in Fig. 8, and want to answer the following questions:
• How does the path multiplicity change the original social efficiency without incentive design?
• How to apply the side-payment and content-restriction mechanisms to this generalized network model
and what are the new challenges?
• Will our main results developed in previous sections still hold here and what are the new insights?
37
? path, cost ?? ? ?, ??? pieces of information
?? flow
? ? ?? ? ?? flow
a unit mass of users
? path, cost ?? ? ?, ??? pieces of informationuser of type ??user of type ??
s’ ts
?? pieces 
of information? path, cost ?? ? ?, ??? pieces of information ?? flow
????
??
???
Fig. 10. There are K possible routes from s to t and all routes contain a common link from s to intermediary s′ which contains N0 pieces of
information. From s′ to t, users must select one among K possible links, denoted as P1, P2, · · · , PK . Each of these parallel links uniformly
contains N/K pieces of information, keeping the total information constant.
A. New Network Model and Equilibrium
As shown in Fig. 10, we consider K routes from s to t and all routes have a common link from s to
intermediary s′ which contains N0 pieces of information. As all users go through this common link, their
collected information is
Q0 = N0
(
1− (1−
φ
N0
)n
)
,
which is calculated as in (1). Without much loss of generality, we assume traveling on the common link
from s to s′ generates no cost. From s′ to t, users must select one out of K links, denoted as P1, P2, · · · ,
PK . Each of these parallel links uniformly contains N/K pieces of information. To keep the average travel
cost over all K paths at cH/2, i.e., the same as in the prior two-path model,, we set the cost over any path
Pk as
ck =
k − 1
K − 1
cH , ∀k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}.
We summarize the unit mass of users’ routing choices as non-negative flows (x1, x2, · · · , xK) such that∑K
k=1 xk = 1. Similar to (2) in the two-path model, we define the total information content collected and
aggregated by the users from the K routes as Q(x1, x2, · · · , xK), which is given by
Q(x1, x2, · · · , xK) = Q0 +
K∑
k=1
Q1(xk),
where Q1(xk) denotes the information content collected over a single link Pk when a fraction xi of the
users travel over that link. Similar to the specific Q1(·) function in (1) defined in Section II, now we have
Q1(xk) =
N
K
(
1− (1−
Kφ
N
)nxk
)
.
38
We assume all users are of the same type (i.e., θ1 = θ2 = θ0) for tractability of analysis.15 Similar to (5) in
Section II, here the payoff function of a homogeneous user by choosing path Pk is
u(Pk, x1, x2, · · · , xK) = θ0Q(x1, · · · , xK)− ck. (29)
In the following, we similarly define the routing equilibrium (xˆ1, xˆ2, · · · , xˆK) as in Definition 1.
Definition 2: A feasible flow (xˆ1, xˆ2, · · · , xˆK) in the content routing game is an equilibrium if no user
traveling over any of the K paths will profit by deviating from her current path choice to increase her
payoff.
The social welfare now becomes
SW (x1, x2 · · · , xK) = θ0Q(x1, x2 · · · , xK)−
K∑
k=1
ckxk, (30)
and the social optimum flow (x∗1, x∗2 · · · , x∗K) is to maximize (30).
Since path P1 does not incur any cost (c1 = 0), all users are better off by choosing path P1. We have
the following result by generalizing Propositions 1 and 2 (where K = 2) via a similar proof analysis.
Proposition 6: There exists a unique equilibrium for the content routing game: xˆ1 = 1 and xˆ2 = · · · =
xˆK = 0. The price of anarchy of the content routing game without incentive design is PoA = 1/K.
Proof: Let SK denote the set of all feasible flow partitions, i.e.,
SK := {(x1, x2, · · · , xK)|x1, x2, · · · , xK ∈ [0, 1] and x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xK = 1}.
Note that the maximal quantity of content is attained by letting 1/K flow go through each path, hence
SW (x∗1, x
∗
2, · · · , x
∗
K) ≤ max
(x1,x2,··· ,xK)∈SK
{θ0Q(x1, x2, · · · , xK)}
= 3θ0Q1(
1
K
) + θ0Q0.
Thus the price of anarchy is lower-bounded as follows:
PoA ≥ min
θi,Q1(·),cH
θ0Q1(1) + θ0Q0
Kθ0Q1(
1
K
) + θ0Q0
≥
1
K
.
We can show that the bound is also tight and hence PoA = 1/K by constructing a suitable function
Q1(x). Let
Q1(x) =

 Kqx 0 ≤ x ≤
1
K
;
q 1
K
≤ x ≤ 1.
(31)
15We plan to study the two heterogeneous user types for the general network model in the future, where the IR constraint may be violated
for type-1 users as in side-payment mechanism design in Section III-B.
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Consider Q0 = 0 and any fixed cH > 0. Using this setup, the PoA for this specific instance becomes
PoA ≤ min
θi,cH
θ0Q1(1)
SW ( 1
K
, 1
K
, · · · , 1
K
)
= min
θi,cH
θ0q
Kθ0q −
K∑
k=1
ck
K
=
1
K
.
This completes the proof that PoA = 1/K.
The equilibrium completely ignores the content on all other paths except path P1, leading to a low
POA = 1/K. As the path multiplicity K increases to infinity, the price of anarchy and social efficiency
decrease to zero. Thus, mechanism design is more needed in a multi-path network. The path overlap does
not make any difference because all users must travel through the overlapping path and collect the fixed
content Q0. For illustration purpose and without much loss of generality, in the following mechanism design
we focus on K = 3 and also explain the results for arbitrary K.
B. Side-payment as Incentive
When applying side-payment to the multi-path model, we design individual side-payment functions
gk(x1, x2, · · · , xK) for participants over path Pk with k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}. Unlike payment function (11)
in Proposition 3, now it is more complicated to design K many side-payment functions to incentivize the
social welfare maximizer (x∗1, x∗2 · · · , x∗K) as the equilibrium target, while maintaining the budget balanced.
Moreover, given a user has more routing options to deviate from the existing choice, the stability of
equilibrium is more difficult to prove even in the three-path network. In that respect we have introduced
more sophisticated Lyapunov function techniques to ensure and prove the target equilibrium’s asymptotic
stability. This allows us to successfully design side-payment functions for the three paths which are shown
in Proposition 7. For the more general case K > 3, similar approach applies.
Proposition 7: In a three-path network model with travel costs (c1, c2, c3) = (0, cH/2, cH), to incentivize
users to choose paths P2 and P3 and converge from any initial flow to the social welfare maximizer
(x∗1, x
∗
2, x
∗
3), we design side-payment functions on paths P1 and P2 as
 g
1
(x∗1,x
∗
2,x
∗
3)
(x1, x2, x3) =
(1−x2−x3)(x∗2c2+x
∗
3c3)
1−x∗2−x
∗
3
,
g2(x∗1,x∗2,x∗3)
(x1, x2, x3) = −
(1−x2−x3)2x∗2c2
(1−x∗2−x
∗
3)x2
+ x3(c3 − c2).
(32)
Note that as expected the side-payment on path P1 is larger than that on P2 (i.e., g1 > g2). This side-payment
mechanism perfectly achieves price of anarchy PoAg = 1 without any loss of system efficiency.
Proof: To enforce BB, the money we refund to each path participant over path P3 is,
(1− x2 − x3)
2x∗3c3
(1− x∗3 − x
∗
2)x3
− x2(c2 − c2). (33)
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Given (33) and the side-payment function (32), a user’s payoff now becomes
u(Pk, x1, x2, x3) =


θ0Q(x1, x2, x3)−
x1(x∗2c2+x
∗
3c3)
x∗1
, if k = 1;
θ0Q(x1, x2, x3) +
x21x
∗
2c2
x∗1x2
− x3(c3 − c2)− c2, if k = 2;
θ0Q(x1, x2, x3) +
x21x
∗
3c3
x∗1x3
− x2(c2 − c3)− c3, if k = 3.
(34)
where x1 = 1−x2−x3, x∗1 = 1−x∗2−x∗3. One can check that when (x1, x2, x3) = (x∗1, x∗2, x∗3), each user’s
payoff is
u(Pk, x
∗
1, x
∗
2, x
∗
3) = θ0Q(x
∗
1, x
∗
2, x
∗
3)− x
∗
2c2 − x
∗
3c3 ≥ 0,
for any Pk ∈ {P1, P2, P3}. Thus, every user receives the same payoff no matter which path she chooses
and hence (x∗1, x∗2, x∗3) is an equilibrium. Note that each user’s equilibrium payoff is equal to the optimal
social welfare which is nonnegative, IR is satisfied. IC is also satisfied since the payment function only
depends on the path choice and is irrelevant to users’ types.
Next we prove (x∗1, x∗2, x∗3) is a unique equilibrium. One can check that if (xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3) is an equilibrium,
then xˆk 6= 0 for any k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. For example, we assume xˆ1 = 0, then the payoff function (34) evaluated
at (xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3) is
u(Pk, xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3) =


θ0Q(xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3), if k = 1;
θ0Q(xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3)− xˆ3(c3 − c2)− c2, if k = 2;
θ0Q(xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3)− xˆ2(c2 − c3)− c3, if k = 3.
Note that now u(P3, xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3) = u(P2, xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3) < u(P1, xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3), thus all users have incentive to
switch to L-path. Hence, xˆ1 6= 0. Similarly, we can prove that xˆ2 6= 0 and xˆ3 6= 0. Thus, at an equilibrium
(xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3), each path has positive flow. As a result, we have
u(P3, xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3) = u(P2, xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3) = u(P1, xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3). (35)
The only feasible solution to (35) is
(xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3) = (x
∗
1, x
∗
2, x
∗
3).
Therefore, we have proven that (x∗1, x∗2, x∗3) is a unique equilibrium.
Finally, we will prove (x∗1, x∗2, x∗3) is a stable equilibrium. In [16], the author studied the stability of
Wardrop’s equilibrium. Firstly, the author defined the dynamics of the flow: the flows switch form path P
to P ′ at rate xP max{0, CP − CP ′} where CP is the cost on P -path. Then Lyapunov function is used to
obtain the stability results. Now we will modify the payoff defined in (34) in order to apply the results in
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[16]. Note that in (34), the content part θ0Q(x1, x2, x3) is the same for each user no matter which path she
chooses. Thus, our network model is equivalent to having cost functions defined on each path as follows,
CP (x1, x2, x3) =


x1(x∗2c2+x
∗
3c3)
x∗1
, if P = P1;
−
x21x
∗
2c2
x∗1x2
+ x3(c3 − c2) + c2, if P = P2;
−
x21x
∗
3c3
x∗1x3
+ x2(c2 − c3) + c3, if P = P3.
Define C(x1, x2, x3) := (CP1(x1, x2, x3), CP2(x1, x2, x3), CP3(x1, x2, x3)). Now we can use exactly the same
dynamical system (5) defined in [16]. To prove the stability of this dynamical system, we only need to
prove C(·) is monotone. Let J be the Jacobian matrix of C(·) evaluated at (x1, x2, x3), then
J =


x∗2c2+x
∗
3c3
x∗1
0 0
−
2x1x∗2c2
x2x
∗
1
x21x
∗
2c2
x23x
∗
1
−c2 + c3
−
2x1x∗3c3
x3x
∗
1
c2 − c3
x21x
∗
3c3
x23x
∗
1

 .
One can easily check that J is positive definite. Thus, (x∗1, x∗2, x∗3) is asymptotically stable as an equilibrium.
Therefore, we can obtain the social optimal flow (x∗1, x∗2, x∗3) as a stable and unique equilibrium by
applying the side-payment function defined in (32). In addition, IR, IC, and BB are all satisfied.
With the help of the above side-payment mechanism, we greatly increase the POA from 1/3 (Proposi-
tion 5) to 1. The path multiplicity does not change the side-payment’s efficiency and PoA = 1 holds for
arbitrary K.
C. Content-restriction as Incentive
We now apply content-restriction to the multi-path network model. To motivate more users to choose the
higher cost paths (P2, · · · , PK) instead of zero cost P1, the system planner should only provide a fraction
ak ∈ [0, 1] of the total information content to participants over the lower-cost path Pk ∈ {P1, · · · , PK−1}.
As lower cost path participants need more incentives to change routes, we expect that ak increases with
the path index k.
Unlike the two-path model in Section IV, more paths here imply more possible equilibria when under
the content-restriction mechanism. In addition, multiple paths may challenge the stability of the equilibria.
We may obtain infinitely many equilibria but only a subset of them is stable. Still, we design Lyapunov
function to ensure and prove that our content-restriction coefficients ak’s lead the user flow partition to the
stable subset of equilibria (instead of a particular one), where each equilibrium in this stable set attains
the same total system efficiency. In the following proposition, we design content-restriction coefficients
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for three-path case. For a more general case (K > 3), one can derive the content-restriction coefficients
analogously although the analysis will be more tedious.
Proposition 8: The content-restriction operates differently according to the travel cost distribution:
• In low cost regime (i.e., cH ≤ 2θ0(3Q1(13)− 2Q1(12)), it is optimal to choose
a1 = 1−
c3
3θ0Q1(
1
3
) + θ0Q0 − ǫ
, a2 = 1−
c3 − c2
3θ0Q1(
1
3
) + θ0Q0 − ǫ
,
with a1 < a2 to approach the path diversity equilibrium (xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) among the
three paths, and the optimal social welfare is SWa → 3θ0Q1(1/3) + θ0Q0 − c3.
• In medium cost regime (2θ0(3Q1(13)−2Q1(12)) < cH ≤ 2θ0(2Q1(12)−Q1(1))), it is optimal to choose
a1 = 1−
c2
2θ0Q1(
1
2
) + θ0Q0 − ǫ
, a2 = 1
to approach only the path diversity between path P1 and path P2 with equilibrium (xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3) =
(1/2, 1/2, 0), and optimal social welfare is SWa → 2θ0Q1(1/2) + θ0Q0 − c2.
• In high cost regime (cH > 2θ0(2Q1(12)−Q1(1))), it is optimal to choose a1 = a2 = 1 and keep the
zero path-diversity equilibrium, and the corresponding social welfare is θ0Q1(1) + θ0Q0.
By searching over all possible parameters and information value function Q1(·), the mechanism achieves
PoAa = 1/3.
Proof: When we apply content-restriction as incentive, at the equilibrium, there are three possibilities:
1) Only one path is used by the users. 2) Exactly two paths are used by the users. 3) All three paths are
used by the users. We analyse these three case in the following:
Analysis of 1): Since only one path is used, the content collected hence is Q1(1)+Q0. Note that we can
simply adopt the original equilibrium and avoid any loss of social welfare due to destruction of content. Thus,
we optimally choose a1 = a2 = 1 and the corresponding social welfare at the equilibrium is θ0Q1(1)+θ0Q0.
Analysis of 2): If we expect exactly two paths are used at the equilibrium, we need to make the payoffs
from choosing these two paths be equal and strictly larger than the payoff from choosing the third path.
Among all possible pairs of paths, we always prefer path P1 and path P2. This is because to achieve
the same path diversity, less content needs to be restricted when we only use a1 < 1 and a2 = 1 to
make the payoffs from choosing paths P1 and P2 the same. Now this case is equivalent to using content-
restriction as incentive in two-path model. According to the results from Section IV, we optimally choose
a1 = 1 − c2/(2θ0Q
′
1(1/2) + θ0Q0 − ǫ) and a2 = 1 to approach the perfect path diversity between path P1
and path P2 (0, 1/2, 1/2) and optimal social welfare is 2θ0Q′1(1/2) + θ0Q0 − c2.
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Analysis of 3): If we expect all the three paths are used at the target equilibrium (xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3), we need to
choose proper a1 and a2 to make the payoffs from choosing these three paths be equal:
a1θ0Q(xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3) = a2θ0Q(xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3)− c2 = θ0Q(xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3)− c3.
The social welfare attained at the target equilibrium (xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3) is
θ0Q(xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3)− c3.
Thus, the equilibrium we prefer is (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), i.e., flow are partitioned equally among three paths, where
the content is maximized. The content-restriction coefficients we use to incentive this perfect path-diversity
equilibrium are
a1 = 1−
c2
3θ0Q1(
1
3
) + θ0Q0
, a2 = 1−
c3 − c2
3θ0Q1(
1
3
) + θ0Q0
.
The corresponding social welfare is 3θ0Q1(1/3)+ θ0Q0− c3. However, (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) is unstable. Instead,
we will choose
a1 = 1−
c3
3θ0Q1(
1
3
) + θ0Q0 − ǫ
, a2 = 1−
c3 − c2
3θ0Q1(
1
3
) + θ0Q0 − ǫ
(36)
to incentivize a stable set of equilibria as follows:
E := {(x1, x2, x3) ∈ S3|Q(x1, x2, x3) = 3θ0Q1(
1
3
) + θ0Q0 − ǫ, 2x3 + x2 > 1}
Because the continuity and symmetry of Q(x1, x2, x3), E is not empty. First we define the evolution of the
system. We let Pmax(x1, x2, x3) denote the set of most profitable paths when the current flow partition is
(x1, x2, x3), i.e.,
Pmax(x1, x2, x3) = argmax
Pk∈{P1,P2,P3}
{u(Pk, x1, x2, x3)}.
Let Pmin(x1, x2, x3) denote the least profitable path when the current flow partition is (x1, x2, x3), i.e.,
Pmin(x1, x2, x3) = argmin
Pk∈{P1,P2,P3}
{u(Pk, x1, x2, x3)}.
We denote a path in Pmax (Pmin) by Pmax (Pmin). Now we define the differential equation which governs
the evolution of the system by
dx3
dt
=


µ(u(P3, x1, x2, x3)− u(Pmin(x1, x2, x3), x1, x2, x3)), if P3 ∈ Pmax(x1, x2, x3);
µ(u(P3, x1, x2, x3)− u(Pmax(x1, x2, x3), x1, x2, x3)), if P3 ∈ Pmin(x1, x2, x3);
0, else.
(37)
dx2
dt
=


µ(u(P2, x1, x2, x3)− u(Pmin(x1, x2, x3), x1, x2, x3)), if P2 ∈ Pmax(x1, x2, x3);
µ(u(P2, x1, x2, x3)− u(Pmax(x1, x2, x3), x1, x2, x3)), if P2 ∈ Pmin(x1, x2, x3);
0, else.
(38)
44
where µ > 0 indicating the convergence rate. Thus, a user’s strategy in each step is to firstly check whether
his current path is the least profitable one. If her path is the least profitable one, she will change to the
most profitable path with some positive probability. Otherwise, she will keep to her current path choice.
Note that x1+x2+x3 = 1, Q(x1, x2, x3) is determined given x2 and x3. Thus, we can write Q(x1, x2, x3)
as a function of only x2 and x3, i.e., we define
Q(x2, x3, 1) := Q0 +Q1(x2) +Q1(x3) +Q1(1− x2 − x3).
Let I = {(x2, x3)|(x1, x2, x3) ∈ S3 and 2x3 + x2 > 1} and E2 = {(x2, x3)|(x1, x2, x3) ∈ E} it is easy to
see that for all (x1, x2, x3) ∈ I ,
∂Q(x2, x3, 1)
∂x3
< 0.
Now we define the following Lyapunov function
V (x2, x3) = (Q(x2, x3, 1)− 3θ0Q1(
1
3
)− θ0Q0 + ǫ)
2 ∀(x1, x2, x3) ∈ I.
Compute the first derivative, ∀(, x2, x3) ∈ I ,
dV (x2, x3)
dt
= 2(Q(x2, x3, 1)− 3θ0Q1(
1
3
)− θ0Q0 + ǫ))(
∂Q(x2, x3, 1)
∂x3
∂x3
∂t
+
∂Q(x2, x3, 1)
∂x2
∂x2
∂t
).
Note that if Q(x2, x3, 1) − 3θ0Q′1(13) − θ0Q0 + ǫ > 0, we have u(P3, x1, x2, x3) > u(P2, x1, x2, x3) >
u(P1, x1, x2, x3). Then, according to the dynamic we define,
∂xH
∂t
> 0,
∂xM
∂t
= 0.
If Q(xH , xM , 1) − 3θ0Q′1(13) − θ0Q0 + ǫ < 0, we have u(H, xH , xM) < u(M,xH , xM) < u(L, xH , xM).
Then, according to the dynamic we define,
∂x3
∂t
< 0,
∂x2
∂t
= 0.
It follows that
dV (x2, x3)
dt
< 0, ∀(x2, x3) ∈ I/E.
Since V (x2, x3) = 0 for all (x2, x3) ∈ E2 and V (x2, x3) > 0 for all (x2, x3) ∈ I/E2, E is a stable set of
equilibria. Note that a1 and a2 are fixed, value of Q(x1, x2, x3) are the same for all the equilibria in E, we
conclude that we achieve the same social welfare for each equilibrium in E. As ǫ→ 0, the social welfare
obtained at any equilibrium in E goes to θ0Q(xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3)− c3.
Now we only need to compare the optimal social welfare attained in the three cases:
θ0Q1(1) + θ0Q0, 2θ0Q1(
1
2
) + θ0Q0 − c2, 3θ0Q1(
1
3
) + θ0Q0 − c3,
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and choose proper a1 and a2 to incentivize the equilibrium with the largest social welfare. Note that
(c1, c2, c3) = (0, cH/2, cH). If cH > 2θ0(2Q1(12) − Q1(1)), it is optimal to choose a1 = a2 = 1. If
2θ0(3Q1(
1
3
)−2Q1(
1
2
)) < cH ≤ 2θ0(2Q1(
1
2
)−Q1(1)), we optimally choose a1 = 1−c2/(2θ0Q1(1/2)+θ0Q0−
ǫ) and a2 = 1. If cH > 2θ0(2Q1(12)−Q1(1)), we optimally choose a1 = 1− c3/(3θ0Q1(1/3) + θ0Q0 − ǫ)
and a2 = 1− (c3 − c2)/(3θ0Q1(1/3) + θ0Q0 − ǫ).
Next we will prove that the price of anarchy is 1/3. Note that SW (x∗1, x∗2, x∗3) ≤ 3θ0Q1(13) + θ0Q0 and
we can always choose a1 = a2 = 1 and obtain the zero path-diversity equilibrium, the price of anarchy is
lower-bounded as follows:
PoAa ≥ min
θi,Q1(·),Q0,cH
θ0Q1(1) + θ0Q0
3θ0Q1(
1
3
) + θ0Q0
≥
1
3
.
Consider a specific Q1(·) function as following
Q1(x) =


qx
δ
0 ≤ x ≤ δ;
q δ ≤ x ≤ 1.
(39)
where we let δ be near zero. Let cH = 2θ0q and Q0 = 0, then
θ0Q1(1) + θ0Q0 = 2θ0Q1(
1
2
) + θ0Q0 − c2 = 3θ0Q1(
1
3
) + θ0Q0 − c3 = θ0q.
Note that SW (x∗1, x∗2, x∗3) = SW (1−2δ, δ, δ) for infinitesimal δ > 0. Since SW (1−2δ, δ, δ) = 3θ0q−δc2−
δc3, we have for this specific instance the price of anarchy is
PoAa ≤
θ0q
3θ0q − δc2 − δc3
,
for infinitesimal δ > 0. Hence PoAa ≤ 1/3. This completes the proof.
VIII. EXTENSIONS TO MULTIPLE USER TYPES AND DYNAMIC INFORMATION COLLECTION
A. Continuous User Types
In this subsection, we extend our mechanisms to the uniformly distributed user types in a continuous
range. Assume the users’ valuation for content θ follows a uniform distribution U [0, 1].
1) Routing Equilibrium without Incentive Design: Without incentive design, a user’s path choice does
not depend on her type. Notice no matter which path a user of type-θ chooses, the information value she
perceived is always θQ(xH , 1) and hence her choice only depends on path cost. Therefore, the selfish routing
strategy is for every user to choose the L-path at the equilibrium which is the same as in Proposition 1.
Proposition 9: There exists a unique equilibrium for the content routing game: xˆH = 0 and the resultant
social welfare is
SW (0) =
∫ 1
0
θQ(0, 1)dθ = 0.5Q(0, 1).
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2) Side-payment as Incentive: The side-payment mechanism is defined in Section III. Similar to (9), the
payoff of a user of type-θ under the side-payment mechanism is given by
uθ(P, xH) =

 θQ(xH , b)− g(xH), if P = L;θQ(xH , b)− cH + b−xHxH g(xH), if P = H.
(40)
Since side-payment does not depend on a user’s type, Proposition 3 still holds. We only need to reconsider
users’ IR in the side-payment design. Given the side-payment function (11), an equilibrium xˆH satisfies IR
for any user with type-θ if,
θQ(xˆH , b)−
xˆHcH
b
≥ 0,
where b is the active participation fraction (0 ≤ b ≤ 1). Since 1− b is the lowest type whose IR is satisfied,
we have the following condition for b ∈ (0, 1]:
(1− b)Q(xˆH , b)−
xˆHcH
b
= 0.
We rewrite the condition such that it also holds for b = 0 as follows:
(1− b)bQ(xˆH , b)− xˆHcH = 0. (41)
Now we only need to properly choose b and xˆH to maximize the social welfare which is given by∫ 1
1−b
θQ(xˆH , 1)dθ =
b(2 − b)
2
Q(xˆH , b)− xˆHcH .
We denote the optimal solution to
max
b∈[0,1]
xH∈[0,b]
b(2− b)
2
Q(xH , b)− xHcH (42)
subject to (41) as (xHg, bg) and the corresponding social welfare as SWg(xHg, bg).
Proposition 10: When the user types follows uniform distribution U [0, 1], the optimal side-payment
design is to choose the side-payment in (11) with xˆH = xHg to achieve the optimal social welfare
SWg(xHg, bg) =
bg(2− bg)
2
Q(xHg, bg)− xHgcH .
In Section III, the active participation fraction b is either 0.5 or 1. We only need to compare the full
participation case with b = 1 with the half participation case with b = 0.5 and choose the better one as in
Theorem 1. When user types are continuous, we need to optimally choose the active participation fraction
b in the range [0, 1] as in Proposition 10.
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3) Content-restriction as Incentive: The content-restriction mechanism is defined in Section IV. Similar
to Section IV, if we expect positive flows with xˆH ∈ (0, 1) and 1 − xˆH on both paths at the equilibrium,
any user with type-θ = 1 − xˆH should be indifferent in choosing between the both paths. Her payoffs by
choosing L-path and H-path are equal, i.e.,
(1− xˆH)Q(xˆH , 1) =
cH
(1− a)
.
Then all users with type θ smaller than (1− xˆH) will choose L-path and all users with type θ larger than
(1− xˆH) will choose H-path. Thus, the social welfare attained at equilibrium xˆH is∫ 1−xˆH
0
θaQ(xˆH)dθ +
∫ 1
1−xˆH
Q(xˆH)dθ − xˆHcH
= 0.5(Q(xˆH , 1)− (1 + xˆH)cH).
Now we only need to properly choose a and target xˆH to maximize the social welfare
max
xH∈(0,1)
0.5(Q(xH , 1)− (1 + xH)cH). (43)
We denote the optimal solution to (43) as xHa and the corresponding social welfare is SWa(xHa). Then, the
content-restriction is to compare SWa(xHa) and the equilibrium social welfare with a = 1, i.e., 0.5Q(0, 1)
to decide to incentivize xˆH = xHa or xˆH = 0.
Proposition 11: When the user types follows uniform distribution U [0, 1], depending on the relationship
between SWa(xHa) and 0.5Q(0, 1), we decide a and which equilibrium xˆH to incentivize:
• If the travel cost over H-path is small, i.e.,
cH <
Q(xHa, 1)−Q(0, 1)
1 + xHa
,
it is optimal to choose
a = 1−
cH
(1− xHa)Q(xHa, 1)
to reach the optimal social welfare
SWa(xHa) = 0.5(Q(xHa, 1)− (1 + xHa)cH).
• If the travel cost is large, i.e.,
cH ≥
Q(xHa, 1)−Q(0, 1)
1 + xHa
,
it is optimal to choose a = 1 since content destruction must be too excessive to incentivize path
diversity. The corresponding social welfare is 0.5Q(0, 1).
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Similar to Section IV, when the travel cost cH is too high, we may skip the path-diversity, as it is too
expensive for any user type to cover the H-path. When the travel cost cH is small, different from two user
types case, the optimal equilibrium is not always the perfect path-diversity equilibrium xˆH = 0.5 and it is
determined by the specific value of cH .
B. Dynamic Information Model
In this subsection we no longer consider the one-shot content routing game as in Section II, we study
the dynamic version of our content routing game. Here users need to make a travel decision in each time
slot and such decision-making is myopic and happens repeatedly. In each time slot t, each user chooses a
path H or L. We denote by xHt the fraction of the users that choose the H-path at the tth (t ∈ N) time
period and leaving 1− xHt to use the L-path.
We assume each path has N/2 independent information pieces with no information overlap between
paths. At time 0, there are Q0 = QH0 + QL0 independent pieces of information which is known to every
user where QH0 is the amount of information on H-path and QL0 is the amount of information on L-path.
We denote by ∆QHt and the expected number of independent pieces of information collected over H-path
during the tth time period. According to (1) we have
∆QHt =
N
2
(
1− (1−
2φ
N
)nxHt
)
. (44)
Similarly, we denote by ∆QLt and the expected number of independent pieces of information collected
over L- respectively during the tth time period, then
∆QLt =
N
2
(
1− (1−
2φ
N
)n(1−xHt)
)
. (45)
We denote by Qt the quantity of information available to the users at time t. It consists of the initial
information Q0 and the information collected during t time periods. The information collected by the users
may not be useful all the time, we need to eliminate the outdated information. We model this fact by a
information discount factor γ ∈ (0, 1). We suppose the quantity of the useful information decreases at a
fixed rate of γ. For example, if at time t−1, there are Qt−1 amount of useful information in the information
pool, then at time t only γQt−1 amount of information are still useful. We denote by QHt the quantity of
useful information on H-path at time t, then
QHt =
N
2
(1− (1−
2γQH(t−1)
N
)(1−
2∆QHt
N
)). (46)
We denote by QLt the quantity of useful information on L-path at time t, then
QLt =
N
2
(1− (1−
2γQL(t−1)
N
)(1−
2∆QLt
N
)), (47)
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and Qt = QHt +QLt. We assume the users are non-atomic and have same valuations for content θ = 0.5.
We assume the users are myopic, i.e., they only care about their payoff at the current period. If a user
with type θ chooses path P ∈ {H,L} at time slot t, her payoff is the difference between her perceived
information value θQt and the travel cost on path P . That is,
uθ(P ) =

 θQt, if P = L;θQt − cH , if P = H. (48)
and the user will prefer the path with a higher payoff. In the following, we will characterize the equilibrium
of the dynamic routing game and the stationary state.
1) Routing Equilibrium without Incentive Design and Social Optimum: Notice that no matter which path
a user chooses at time t, the information value she perceived is always θQt and hence her choice only
depends on the path cost. Therefore, the selfish routing strategy is for every user to choose the L-path at
the equilibrium at any time t.
Proposition 12: At any time t, there exists a unique equilibrium for the content routing game: xˆHt = 0. At
the stationary state, the unique equilibrium for the content routing game is xˆH∞ = 0 and the corresponding
social welfare is
ŜW∞ =
N(1− r)
4(1− γr)
,
where
r = (1−
2φ
N
)n.
Proof: We only need to derive the stationary social welfare for the equilibrium. During the tth time
period, the information collected at the equilibrium is
∆QˆHt = 0, ∆QˆLt =
N(1− r)
2
.
By (46) and (47), we have the following recursions to calculate the total information available at time t:
QˆHt = γQˆH(t−1),
QˆLt = γQˆL(t−1) +
N(1 − r)
2
.
Solve the two recursions, we have taht at the stationary state the information available on each path is
QˆH∞ = 0, QˆL∞ =
N(1− r)
2(1− γr)
.
Thus we can calculate the stationary social welfare for the equilibrium:
ŜW∞ =
N(1− r)
4(1− γr)
.
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If we let γ → 1, we have QˆH∞ = 0 and QˆL∞ = N/2, i.e., we can have the total information on L-path
but no information on H-path if the information do not change with time.
If we can perfectly control all users’ decisions in a centralized way, we can achieve the social optimum
which is shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 13: The optimal stationary flow to achieve the social optimum is x∗H∞. x∗H∞ is equal to 0 if
(r − 1)N ln r
(1− γr)
≤ 4cH ,
Otherwise, x∗H∞ is the solution to the following equation concerning xH :
(1− γ)(
r1−xH
1− γr1−xH
−
rxH
1− γrxH
)N ln q = 4cH .
At the stationary state, the information available on H-path is
Q∗H∞ =
N
2
1− rx
∗
H∞
1− γrx
∗
H∞
,
the information available on L-path is
Q∗L∞ =
N
2
1− r1−x
∗
H∞
1− γr1−x
∗
H∞
.
The optimal stationary social welfare is
SW ∗∞ =
N
4
(
1− rx
∗
H∞
1− γrx
∗
H∞
+
1− r1−x
∗
H∞
1− γr1−x
∗
H∞
)− x∗H∞cH .
Proof: Since users are myopic, we optimize the social welfare for each time period separately. The
social welfare optimization problem is formulated as
max
xHt∈[0,1]
1
2
Qt(xHt, QH(t−1), QL(t−1))− xHtcH .
The objective function is a concave function of xHt. First order condition gives
ln r(
N
2
− γQH(t−1))r
1−xHt − ln r(
N
2
− γQH(t−1))r
xHt = 2cH .
If ln r(N
2
− γQH(t−1))r − ln r(
N
2
− γQH(t−1)) ≤ 2cH , optimal solution is xHt = 0. Otherwise, the optimal
solution is the unique solution of the above equation. Let x∗Ht denote the optimal solution. The optimal
social welfare at time t is
SW ∗Ht =
1
2
Qt(x
∗
Ht, QH(t−1), QL(t−1))− x
∗
HtcH .
Next we will find the stationary state for social optimum. Since we have the following recursions:
Q∗Ht =
N
2
− (
N
2
− γQˆH(t−1))r
x∗Ht,
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Q∗Lt =
N
2
− (
N
2
− γQˆL(t−1))r
1−x∗
Ht,
it follows that
Q∗H∞
N
2
1− rxH
1− γrx
∗
H∞
,
Q∗L∞ =
N
2
1− rxL
1− γr1−x
∗
H∞
,
where x∗H∞ is the optimal stationary flow. By first order condition,
ln r(
N
2
− γQ∗L∞)r
1−x∗H∞ − ln r(
N
2
− γQ∗H∞)r
x∗H∞ = 2cH .
Plug in Q∗H∞ and Q∗L∞, we get
(1− γ)(
r1−x
∗
H∞
1− γr1−x
∗
H∞
−
rx
∗
H∞
1− γrx
∗
H∞
)N ln r = 4cH .
Thus when
(r − 1)N ln r
(1− γr)
≤ 4cH ,
the optimal stationary flow is x∗H∞ = 0; otherwise, x∗H∞ is the unique solution to the following equation
concerning xH :
(1− γ)(
r1−xH
1− γr1−xH
−
rxH
1− γrxH
)N ln q = 4cH .
If we let γ → 1, we have Q∗H∞ = N/2 and Q∗L∞ = N/2, i.e., we have the total information on both paths
by controlling all users’ decisions in a centralized way if the information do not change with time.
2) Content-restriction as Incentive: We consider using content-restriction as incentive. Assume at any
time t, the system planner provides a fraction a(t) of the total information, i.e., a(t)Qt, to L-path participants.
a(t) may changes with time t. The intuition is the same as in the one-shot game (Section IV). As long as
the H-path cost cH is not too large, we should optimally choose an apropriate value of a to incentivise the
perfect path-diversity equilibrium (xˆH∞ = 0.5). If the travel cost cH is too high, we may skip the path-
diversity, as it is too expensive for any user type to cover the H-path. The following proposition shows
how to choose a stationary a to achieve the optimal stationary social welfare.
Proposition 14: If the travel cost over H-path is small, i.e.,
cH <
N(1 + γr
1
2 )(1− r
1
2 )2
4(1− γr
1
2 )(1− γr)
,
we optimally choose
a = 1−
2cH(1− γr
1
2 )
N(1 − r
1
2 )
,
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to reach the perfect path-diversity equilibrium xˆH = 0.5 and the optimal stationary social welfare
SWa∞ =
N(1 − r
1
2 )
2(1− γr
1
2 )
− cH .
Otherwise it is optimal to choose a = 1 since content destruction must be too excessive to incentivize path
diversity. The corresponding stationary social welfare is
SWa∞ =
N(1− r)
4(1− γr)
.
Proof: We only need to find the optimal positive path-diversity equilibrium and compare it with the
routing equilibrium without incentive design. At any time t, if we expect positive flows with xˆHt ∈ (0, 1)
and 1− xˆHt on the two paths at the equilibrium, a user’s payoff by choosing L- and H-path are equal, i.e.,
1
2
Qt − cH =
α(t)
2
Qt.
Since each user’s payoff by choosing either path is the same which is
1
2
Qt − cH .
Then the social welfare can be written as
SWat =
1
2
Qt − cH .
We want to maximize such social welfare, first order condition gives
1
2
ln r(
N
2
− γQH(t−1))r
xH =
1
2
ln r(
N
2
− γQL(t−1))r
1−xH .
Let xaHt denote the optimal solution, then
xaHt =
1
2
+
ln
N−2γQL(t−1)
N−2γQH(t−1)
2 ln r
.
The content-restriction coefficient to incentivize this optimal flow is
a(t) = 1−
2cH
Qt(xaHt, QH(t−1), QL(t−1))
.
Next we will find the stationary state. Let QaH∞, QaL∞ denote the stationary quantity of information of
on H-path and L-path respectively. Let xaH∞ denote the stationary flow on H-path. We have the following
equations
QaH∞ =
N
2
1− rx
a
H∞
1− γrx
a
H∞
, QaL∞ =
N
2
1− r1−x
a
H∞
1− γr1−x
a
H∞
,
ln r(
N
2
− γQaL∞)r
1−xa
H∞ − ln r(
N
2
− γQaH∞)r
xa
H∞ = 0.
53
Solve the equations we get
xaH∞ =
1
2
, QaH∞ =
N
2
1− r
1
2
1− γr
1
2
, QaL∞ =
N
2
1− r
1
2
1− γr
1
2
.
Then the optimal stationary social welfare attained at this perfect path-diversity equilibrium is
N(1 − r
1
2 )
2(1− γr
1
2 )
− cH ,
the a we should choose to achieve such perfect path-diversity equilibrium is
a = 1−
2cH(1− γr
1
2 )
N(1 − r
1
2 )
.
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper studies the incentives of participation and route selection in information sharing system by
combining information sharing with routing. We consider a content routing game where a unit mass of non-
atomic selfish users choose between a high-cost and a low-cost path. To remedy the inefficient single path
equilibrium of the content routing game, we design two incentive mechanisms to induce path diversity: side-
payment and content-restriction. We show that both mechanisms achieve path diversity in routing choices
at the cost of user participation or content destruction. We also show that user diversity can have opposite
effects on the two mechanisms. We combine the above-mentioned two mechanisms and show that the
resulting mechanism is much better than any of them used alone with PoAag ≥ 0.7. Finally, we generalize
the results in the previous sections by considering a more general network model and show that similar
techniques can be used to derive the optimal incentive schemes.
There are some possible ways to extend this work. For example, we can add a traffic-dependent congestion
cost to users’ payoffs depending on their path choices and the traffic there, and investigate how the negative
externalities due to traffic congestion will interplay with the positive externalities of information sharing to
decide users’ routing. In Appendix A we have shown that our mechanism design can be easily applied to
a linear traffic-dependent cost model and all the main results including price of anarchy still hold.
Another possible generalization is that some users may value the information along one path differently
than on the other path (say because they actually live near that path and may use this information more).
Hence now a user type is defined by the value (θH , θL) of the content valuation parameters along each of
the paths. In this case the value of content becomes θHQ1(x) + θLQ1(1 − x) and it generalises the case
we studied earlier where θL = θH . Our analysis and mechanism design can also be easily applied to this
non-symmetric case as shown in Appendix B.
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Finally, it is also interesting to extend the one-shot routing game to a repeated game, where users repeat
sensing trips over time and prior content may be useful later on. Some preliminary results are also shown
in Section VIII-B.
APPENDIX
A. Extension to Traffic-dependent Cost
We assume in the previous sections that the travel cost is constant for each path to avoid tedious analysis.
However, one may argue that in reality the traffic flow also affects the travel cost. To address this concern,
we will consider a linear cost model in this section. We will show that the side-payment mechanism and
content-restriction can still be applicable to the new cost model.
Given the traffic flow partition (xH , 1−xH) between H-path and L-path, travelling on the H-path incurs
a travel cost given by
cH + bHxH ,
where cH , bH ≥ 0. Similarly, travelling on the L-path incurs a travel cost given by
cL + bL(1− xH),
where cL, bL ≥ 0. Note that when cH > 0 and bH = cL = bL = 0, this is exactly the constant cost model
we have considered in the previous sections.
We assume all users are of the same type (i.e., θ1 = θ2 = θ0). Similar to (5) in Section II, here the payoff
function of a user is
u(P, xH) =

 θ0Q(xH , 1)− (cL + bL(1− xH)), if P = L;θ0Q(xH , 1)− (cH + bHxH), if P = H.
depending on her path choice P ∈ {L,H}. The social welfare now becomes
SW (xH) = θQ(xH , 1)− (bH + bL)x
2
H + (2bL + cL − cH)xH − (cL + bL).
Following the logic of previous sections, we will compute the Nash equilibrium and social optimum
firstly. If they are not the same, we will design an appropriate side-payment function to remedy the Nash
equilibrium such that under the side-payment function the Nash equilibrium coincides with the socila
optimum. Because the reasoning process is lengthy and very similar to the previous parts, we will omit it
here. Basically, the methodology we use is very standard and straightforward.
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TABLE II. RANGE OF ∆c
Notation Associated range of ∆c
A1 (−∞, θ0Q′1(1) − θ0Q
′
1(0) − 2bH ]
A2 (θ0Q′1(1) − θ0Q
′
1(0) − 2bH ,−bH ]
A3 (−bH ,∆a˜)
A4 {∆a˜}
A5 (∆a˜, bL)
A6 [bL, θ0Q
′
1(0) − θ0Q
′
1(1) + 2bL)
A7 [θ0Q′1(0) − θ0Q
′
1(1) + 2bL,∞)
TABLE III. SIDE-PAYMENT FUNCTION FOR THE LINEAR COST MODEL
Range of ∆c Nash equilibrium xˆH Social optimum x∗H xˆH?x∗H Side-payment function
A1 1 1 xˆH = x∗H gx∗H (xH ) = 0
A2 1 solution to (49) xˆH > x∗H gx∗H (xH ) = g¯(x
∗
H
) +
g¯(x∗H)
x∗
H
(xH − x
∗
H
)
A3
cL+bL−cH
bH+bL
solution to (49) xˆH > x∗H gx∗H (xH ) = g¯(x
∗
H
) +
g¯(x∗H)
x∗
H
(xH − x
∗
H
)
A4
cL+bL−cH
bH+bL
solution to (49) xˆH = x∗H gx∗H (xH ) = 0
A5
cL+bL−cH
bH+bL
solution to (49) xˆH < x∗H gx∗H (xH ) = g¯(x
∗
H ) +
g¯(x∗H)
x∗
H
−1
(xH − x
∗
H)
A6 0 solution to (49) xˆH < x∗H gx∗H (xH ) = g¯(x
∗
H ) +
g¯(x∗H)
x∗
H
−1
(xH − x
∗
H)
A7 0 0 xˆH = x∗H gx∗H (xH ) = 0
1) Side-payment as Incentive: The idea of using side-payment as incentive in this linear cost model
is exactly the same as in the constant cost model: charge more users that take the L-path and providing
positive subsidies to users of the H-path. Only some technical details may be different. Before state our
main results, we introduce two equations. Define ∆c := cH − cL. The first one is
θ0Q
′
1(xH)− θ0Q
′
1(1− xH)− 2(bH + bL)xH + (2bL + cL − cH) = 0. (49)
This equation gives the value of xH such that the derivative of SW (xH) is zero. Note that when ∆c ∈
(−bH , bL), Equation (49) has a unique solution which also denotes the social optimal flow. The second
equation is
θ0Q
′
1(
bL −∆c
bH + bL
)− θ0Q
′
1(
bH + δc
bH + bL
) + ∆c = 0 (50)
This equation gives a value of ∆c such that the social optimum coincides with the Nash equilibrium. Note
that Equation (50) has a unique solution in (−bH , bL) and we denote it by ∆a˜. Also note that ∆a˜ > 0
when bL > bH , ∆a˜ = 0 when bL = bH and ∆a˜ = 0 when bL < bH . As ∆a˜ can be any real number, we
divide its range into several sets listed in Table II.
We summarise all the results in Table III. In Table III, the function g¯(·) is given by
g¯(x∗H) = (cH − cL)x
∗
H − bLx
∗
H + (bH + bL)x
∗
H
2.
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It is the side payment each user of L-path actually pay to ensure that social optimum coincides with Nash
equilibrium and hence it is a function of the social optimal flow x∗H . Note that g¯(x∗H) > 0 when xˆH < x∗H
and g¯(x∗H) < 0 when xˆH > x∗H . This is in accordance with our intuition that when the flow on H-path is
lower than the optimal flow we should penalise the users who choose L-path and when the flow on H-path
is higher than the optimal flow we should reward the users who choose L-path.
We can also prove that the price of anarchy without incentive design is 1/2 and the side payment
mechanism for homogenous user types achieves PoAg = 1. This claim follows trivially from an argument
analogous to the one we used in the proof of Proposition 2.
2) Content-restriction as Incentive: The main ideas of using content-restriction as incentive are exactly
the same as the analogous part in previous sections: to motivate more users to choose the H-path, the
system planner provides a fraction aL of the total information, i.e, aLQ(xH , 1), to L-path participants;
similarly, to motivate more users to choose the L-path, the system planner provides a fraction aH of the
total information, i.e, aHQ(xH , 1), to H-path participants. We will state our results directly since and the
technical details are very tedious. Before state our main results, we introduce two notations. We define xbL
as
xbL ∈ argmax
0≤x≤1
θ0Q(x, 1) + bLx− cL − bL.
Note that xbL gives the value of the flow on H-path such that the payoff of choosing L-path is maximized.
Also note that if θ0Q′(1) ≥ −bL then xbL = 1 and if θ0Q′(1) < −bL then xbL ∈ (1/2, 1). Analogously, we
define xbH as
xbH ∈ argmax
0≤x≤1
θ0Q(x, 1)− bHx− cH .
Note that xbH gives the value of the flow on H-path such that the payoff of choosing H-path is maximized.
Also note that if θ0Q′(1) ≤ bH then xbH = 0 and if θ0Q′(1) > bH then xbL ∈ (0, 1/2). Based on which
domain ∆c is in, our analysis is divided into the following cases:
Case 1: ∆c ∈ A1 ∪A4 ∪A7. As xˆH = x∗H in this case, we don’t need to motivate more users to choose
the L-path or H-path. Hence, we let aH = aL = 1.
Case 2: ∆c ∈ A2 ∪A3. As xˆH > x∗H in this case, we need to motivate more users to choose the L-path.
Hence, we let aL = 1 and aH ≤ 1.
Furthermore, if ∆c < bL − (bH + bL)xbL and θ0Q(xbL) + bLxbL − bL − cL > SW (xˆH), it is optimal to
choose
aH = 1−
bL − (bH + bL)xbL −∆c
θ0Q(xbL , 1)
,
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and the corresponding social welfare is
θ0Q(xbL) + bLxbL − bL − cL.
Otherwise, it is optimal to choose aH = 1 and the corresponding social welfare is same as the Nash
equilibrium.
Case 3: ∆c ∈ A5 ∪A6. As xˆH < x∗H in this case, we need to motivate more users to choose the H-path.
Hence, we let aH = 1 and aL ≤ 1.
Furthermore, if ∆c > bL+(bH + bL)xbH and θ0Q(xbH )− bHxbH − cH > SW (xˆH), it is optimal to choose
aL = 1−
∆c + (bH + bL)xbH − bL
θ0Q(xbH , 1)
,
and the corresponding social welfare is
θ0Q(xbH , 1)− bHxbH − cH .
Otherwise, it is optimal to choose aL = 1 and the corresponding social welfare is same as the Nash
equilibrium.
We can prove that the content-restriction mechanism for homogenous user types achieves PoAa = 1/2.
This claim follows trivially from an argument analogous to the one we used in the proof of Theorem 2.
By now, we only consider the case that user types are homogenous. Actually, our mechanism design can
be applied to heterogeneous users types as well and the main idea is analogous to the constant cost model.
To avoid tedious discussion, we omit it here.
B. Extension to Nonsymmetric Content Function
We assume in the previous sections that the content on both paths are of equally importance to any user
with the same type. However, one may argue that one may value the content one path differently from the
other path. To address this concern, we will consider a nonsymmetric content function in this section.
Given the traffic flow partition (xH , 1 − xH) between H-path and L-path, the content vaue function of
a user of type β is
Q1(xH) + βQ1(1− xH),
where β ∈ (0, 1). This means this user of type β value the content on H-path more than the content on
L-path.
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We assume all users are of the same type β. Similar to (5) in Section II, here the payoff function of a
user is
u(P, xH) =

 Q1(xH) + βQ1(1− xH), if P = L;Q1(xH) + βQ1(1− xH)− cH , if P = H.
depending on her path choice P ∈ {L,H}. The social welfare now becomes
SW (xH) = Q1(xH) + βQ1(1− xH)− cHxH .
Actually, the analysis and results of the previous sections of our paper can be applied to this model
without much efforts. Particularly, the price of anarchy results are exactly the same: the price of anarchy
without incentive design is 1/2, the side payment mechanism for homogenous user types achieves PoAg = 1
and the content-restriction mechanism for homogenous user types achieves PoAa = 1/2.
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